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Following the Money: Lessons from the
Panama Papers
Part 1: Tip of the Iceberg
Lawrence J. Trautman*
ABSTRACT

Widely known as the "Panama Papers," the world's largest
whistleblower case to date consists of 11.5 million documents and
involves a year-long effort by the International Consortium of
Investigative Journalists to expose a global pattern of crime and
corruption where millions of documents capture heads of state, criminals,
and celebrities using secret hideaways in tax havens. Involving the
scrutiny of over 400 journalists worldwide, these documents reveal the
offshore holdings of at least hundreds of politicians and public officials
in over 200 countries.
Since these disclosures became public, national security
implications already include abrupt regime change and probable future
political instability. It appears likely that important revelations obtained
from these data will continue to be forthcoming for years to come.
Presented here is Part 1 of what may ultimately constitute numerousinstallment coverage of this important inquiry into the illicit wealth
derived from bribery, corruption, and tax evasion. This article proceeds
as follows. First, disclosures regarding the treasure trove of documents
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from the Panama-based law firm Mossack Fonseca are reviewed.
Second is a discussion of the impact and cost of bribery and corruption to
the global community. Third, I define and briefly explore issues
surrounding "tax evasion." Fourth, the impact of social media and
technological change on transparency is discussed. Next, a few thoughts
about implications for future research are offered.
Keywords: bribery, capital flows, corruption, criminal enforcement,
data breach, developing countries, ethics, FCPA, FIFA, journalism,
money laundering, Mossack Fonseca, national security, offshore
accounts, Panama papers, scandals, social media, tax compliance, tax
evasion, terrorist financing, transparency, wealthy tax non-filers.
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OVERVIEW
Here, in the United States, there are loopholes that only wealthy
individuals and powerful corporations have access to. They have
access to offshore accounts, and they are gaming the system.
Middle-class families are not in the same position to do this. In fact,
a lot of these loopholes come at the expense of middle-class families,
because that lost revenue has to come from somewhere.
Alternatively, it means that we're not investing as much as we should
in schools, in making college more affordable, in putting people back
to work rebuilding our roads, our bridges, our infrastructure, creating
more opportunities for our children.
PresidentBarack Obama
April 5, 2016'

Widely known as the "Panama Papers," the world's largest
whistleblower case to date consists of 11.5 million documents and
involves a year-long effort by the International Consortium of
Investigative Journalists to expose a "global array of crime and
corruption [where] [m]illions of documents show heads of state,
2
criminals and celebrities using secret hideaways in tax havens."
Involving the scrutiny of over 400 journalists worldwide, these "files
1. Press Release, Barack Obama, President, Remarks by the President on the
Economy, (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/05/re
marks-president-economy-0.
2. Bastian Obermayer et al., Giant Leak of Offshore FinancialRecords Exposes
Global Array of Crime and Corruption, THE INT'L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE

JOURNALISTS (Apr. 3, 2016), https://panamapapers.icij.org/20160403-panama-papersglobal-overview.html.
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reveal the offshore holdings of 140 politicians and public officials . .
includ[ing] the prime ministers of Iceland and Pakistan, the president of
Ukraine, and the King of Saudi Arabia ... More than 214,000 offshore
entities appear in the leak, connected to people in more than 200
countries and territories." 3
Since these disclosures became public, national security
implications already include abrupt regime change and probable future
political instability. It appears highly likely that important revelations
obtained from these data will continue to be forthcoming for years to
come. Presented here is Part 1 of what may ultimately constitute
numerous-installment coverage of this important inquiry into the illicit
wealth derived from bribery, corruption, and tax evasion. This article
proceeds as follows. First, disclosures regarding the treasure trove of
documents from the Panama-based law firm Mossack Fonseca are
reviewed. Second is a discussion of the impact and cost of bribery and
corruption to the global community. Third, I define and explore issues
surrounding "tax evasion." Fourth, the impact of social media and
technological change on transparency is discussed. Next, a few thoughts
about implications for future research are offered. This modest paper
adds to the scholarship about bribery, corruption, money laundering, tax
evasion, terrorist finance, and increased transparency by reviewing
information provided by the Panama Papers to date; and explores
resulting implications for world poverty and global political instability.
II.

INITIAL DISCLOSURES

Perhaps the largest whistleblower case ever, the "Panama Papers,"
at 11.5 million records, is the single largest ever disclosure of intendedsecret documents, and "shows how a global industry of law firms and big
banks sells financial secrecy to politicians, fraudsters, and drug
traffickers as well as billionaires, celebrities and sports stars."A Exhibit 1
depicts the nearly 40 years of data leaked from Panama-based law firm

3.

Id.

4.

Id. See also CRYPTOME, (Feb. 16, 2016), https://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-

tally.htm (noting Greenwald's claim on 13 Sept. 2014 of having 'hundreds of thousands'
of documents); Thomas Fox-Brewster, From EncryptedDrives to Amazon's Cloud-The
Amazing Flight of the Panama Papers, FORBES (Apr. 5, 2016, 8:50 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2016/04/05/panama-papers-amazonencryption-epic-leak/#1eaa39c63a34 (observing 2.6 terabytes of data for the Panama

Papers, contrasted with: Wikileaks Cablegate at 1.7GB, Ashley Madison 30GB, and
SONY Pictures at an estimated 230GB); Andy Greenberg, How ReportersPulled Off the
Panama Papers, The Biggest Leak in History, WIRED (Apr. 4, 2016, 9:17 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2016/04/reporters-pulled-off-panama-papers-biggest-leak-

whistleblower-history/.
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Mossack Fonseca, including information from 21 offshore jurisdictions
about 210,000 companies. 5
Exhibit 1
Incorporated Since 1977
Companies
214,000+ Offshore
By Mossack Fonsaca
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Source: The Panama Papers 6
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists
"The Panama Papers implicate a wide range of firms, politicians,
and other individuals around the globe to have used secret offshore
vehicles. Allegations include tax evasion, financing corruption, money
7
laundering, violation of sanctions, and hiding other activities." The ten
most popular tax havens disclosed by the Panama Papers are shown by
Exhibit 2, revealing that about half (130,000+) of the legal entities were
incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, with Panama the second most
favorite venue.8

5. See Rigoberto Carvajal et al., Explore The Panama Papers Key Figures, THE
INT'L CONSORTIUM OF INTERNATIONAL JOURNALISTS, https://panamapapers.icij.org/

graphs/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2017).
6. See id.
7. James O'Donovan, Hannes Wagner & Stefan Zeume, The Value of Offshore
Secrets-Evidence from the Panama Papers, (Apr. 19, 2016) (unpublished paper),
http://www.valuewalk.com/2016/05/value-offshore-secrets-panama-papers/ (finding the
data leak erased an unprecedented risk-adjusted US$230 billion in market capitalization
among 1,105 firms with exposure to the revelations of the Panama Papers).
8. See Carvajal et al., supra note 5.
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Exhibit 2
The Ten Most Popular Tax Havens in the Panama Papers
0
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HONG KONG
UNITED KINGDOM

Source: The PanamTPapers9
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists
A.

Bombshell: The InitialDisclosures

The April 2016 release of stories based on the Panama Papers
"exposes the offshore holdings of 12 current and former world leaders
and ... provides details of the hidden financial dealings of 128 more
politicians and public officials around the world."o Some of these first
stories appearing most significant include revelations about: the Prime
Minister of Iceland, Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson; Former Great
Britain Prime Minister David Cameron; President Mauricio Macri of
Argentina; high-ranking Chinese government officials; and Russian
President Vladimir V. Putin. 1
1.

Prime Minister of Iceland, Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson

Repercussions from release of the Panama Papers appeared
immediate in the case of the Prime Minister of Iceland, Sigmundur David
Gunnlaugsson.
"Confronted by demands for his resignation after
documents revealing that he and his wealthy wife had set up a company
in the British Virgin Islands led to accusations of a conflict of interest,"1 2
9. See id
10. See Obermayer et al., supra note 2.
11. See Liam Stack, What Are the Panama Papers?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2016/04/05/world/panama-papers-explainer.html?_r-0.
12. Steven Erlanger, Stephen Castle & Rick Gladstone, Iceland's Prime Minister
Steps Down Amid Panama Papers Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/world/europe/panama-papersiceland.html?action=click&contentCollection=World&Module=RelatedCoverage&regio
n+Ma.
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Prime Minister Gunnlaugsson resigned just hours after the news story
was published. According to news accounts derived from the leaked
documents, the company set-up with his wife, "Wintris, Inc., lost
millions of dollars as a result of the 2008 financial crash, which crippled
Iceland, and the company is claiming about $4.2 million from three
failed Icelandic banks. As prime minster since 2013, Mr. Gunnlaugsson
,,13
was involved in reaching a deal for the banks' claimants ....
2.

United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron

British Prime Minister David Cameronl 4 "faced calls for a
government inquiry and accusations of bald hypocrisy by championing
financial transparency-when the leaks showed that his family held
undisclosed wealth in tax havens offshore."" Jeremy Corbyn, leader of
Britain's opposition Labour Party, "called for an independent
investigation into the tax affairs of all Britons linked to the Panama
revelations-including Mr. Cameron's family-and for Britain to impose
direct rule on its overseas territories and dependencies, if necessary, to
get them to comply with British tax law."1 6 In his January 2013 speech
before the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Prime
Minister Cameron stated that he was committed to "driv[ing] a more
serious debate on tax evasion and tax avoidance .

.

..

After years of

abuse people across the planet are rightly calling for more action, and
most importantly there is gathering political will to actually do
something about it."' 7 Following release of the Panama Papers, in an
attempt "belatedly to try to defuse a furor over his finances," The New
York Times reported that Prime Minister Cameron admited "that he had
made a mess of responding to questions about his inheritance from his
father, who had an investment company offshore ... [and released] ...
his tax returns for the past six years."" News source Time reported that
13. Id. See also Lawrence J. Trautman, Personal Ethics & the U.S. Financial
Collapse of 2007-08, (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2502124.
14. Prime Minister Cameron resigned from that position in June 2016, unrelated to
the Panama Papers. See Dan Balz & Karla Adam, For David Cameron, a quick
departure after a stunning defeat, WASH. POST, June 24, 2016, https://www.washing
tonpost.com/politics/for-david-cameron-a-quick-departure-after-a-stunningdefeat/2016/06/24/8d5ff592-3a04-11 e6-9ccdd6005beac8b3_story.html?utm term=.2 1 dc 12bb448b
15. Erlanger et al., supra note 12.
16. Id.
17. Rt. Hon. David Cameron, Prime Minister, U.K., Address Before the World
2013),
(Jan.
24,
Switzerland
Davos,
Forum,
Economic
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-minister-david-camerons-speech-to-theworld-economic-forum-in-davos.
18. Steven Erlanger, David Cameron Releases Tax Data After Panama Papers
Uproar, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/11/world/
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"[t]he revelation that Cameron's own family had benefited from a similar
loophole not only makes him seem like a hypocrite, it also contributes to
a sense that he and his governing Conservative Party live in a different
world to ordinary British taxpayers."'1 9 Transparency International
reported that "[t]he release of the Panama Papers has confirmed the UK's
role as a safe haven for corrupt individuals and their stolen wealth."20
Rachel Davies, Head of UK Advocacy and Research, Transparency
International UK, said:
Last year, the Prime Minister made a personal commitment to end the
UK's role as safe haven for corrupt funds. Now is the real test of
how serious that rhetoric is.

..

. If corrupt individuals are allowed to

continue to buy up luxury property and enjoy life in the UK, then the
Government risks its credibility in leading efforts to tackle corruption
on the global stage.21
3.

President Mauricio Macri of Argentina

One of the first world leaders to be caught up in an appearance of
impropriety was Argentine President Mauricio Macri, listed in a report
by La Nacion to have served as a director from 1998 until 2009 of
Bahamas offshore company Fleg Trading.2 2 At issue, according to early
reports citing Prosecutor Federico Delgado, is whether Mr. Macri had
failed to disclose his role as a director "with malicious intent" "in his
2007 financial declaration, when he became mayor of Buenos Aires, or
in his 2015 declaration when he became president." 23 In response, Mr.
Macri's office is reported to have issued a statement confirming "that a
business group owned by the president's family had set up an offshore
company ....

But . .. because he had never received any income from it

there had been no reason to mention it in the financial declarations. Mr.
Macri campaigned on a promise to combat corruption." 24 These

europe/david-cameron-panama-papers-tax-retum.html.
See also Matt Vasilogambros,
David Cameron Answers for the Panama Papers, ATLANTIC (Apr. 11, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/intemational/archive/2016/04/david-cameron-panamapapers/477726/.
19. Dan Stewart, Why the Panama Papers Are Bad News for David Cameron,
TIME.COM (Apr. 8, 2016), http://time.com/4286316/panama-papers-david-cameron/.
20. Press Release, Transparency International, Panama Papers Expose UK Role in
Global Corruption: Recommendations to End UK Role as a Safe Haven for Corrupt
Money (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/panamapapers
exposeuk rolemin global-corruption.
21. Id.
22. See Panama Papers: Argentina President Macri To Go Before Judge, BBC
NEWS (Apr. 8, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35991155.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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allegations came on the heels of a widening investigation in Argentina
about money laundering "that has gripped Argentina since 2013, when
Jorge Lanata, an influential broadcast journalist, first revealed allegations
of a scheme that involved Lizaro Bdez, a construction baron in Patagonia
who had ties to Mrs. [former president] Kirchner and her late husband
and predecessor, N6stor Kirchner .... 25
4.

High-Ranking Chinese Government Officials

The BBC reports "the allegation that close relatives of seven current
or former Chinese leaders have been found to have links to offshore
firms. Documents leaked from Panama name family members of
Chinese President Xi Jinping and two other members of China's elite
Standing Committee, Zhang Gaoli and Liu Yunshan." 2 6
Despite currency restrictions, reports during recent years of wealthy
Chinese moving money out of China are legion.27 Scholarly inquiries
into Chinese bribery and corruption are robust.2 8 The Wall Street
25.

Jonathan Gilbert, Prosecutor May Add Ex-President to Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,

&

Apr. 9, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/10/world/americas/argentine-prosecut
or-may-add-cristina-femandez-de-kirchner-to-financial-inquiry.html.
26. Jonty Bloom, PanamaPapers: 10 Things We've Learned, BBC NEWS (Apr. 7,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35979313.
27. See generally Craig Karmin, Where Rich Chinese Are Stashing Their Cash:
America's Hotels and Strip Malls, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2015, 9:40 AM,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/where-rich-chinese-are-stashing-their-cash-americas-hotelsand-strip-malls-1449556200; Lingling Wei & Anjani Trivedi, China Boosts Efforts to
Keep Money at Home, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2015, 7:26 PM, http://www.wsj
.com/articles/china-boosts-efforts-to-keep-money-at-home-1441120882; Chuin-Wei Yap,
In China's Alleyways, Underground Banks Move Money, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2015,
11:54 AM, http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-chinas-alleyways-underground-banks-movemoney-1445911877.
28. See generally Andrew Ang, Jennie Bai & Hao Zhou, The Great Wall of Debt:
Real Estate, Corruption, and Chinese Local Government Credit Spreads (Georgetown
McDonough School of Business Research Paper No. 2603022, Aug. 28, 2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2603022; Udo C. Braendle, Tanja Gasser & Juergen Noll,
Corporate Governance in China-Is Economic Growth Potential Hindered by guanxi?
(Apr. 28, 2005), http://ssm.com/abstract-710203; Hongbin Cai, Hanming Fang & Lixin
Colin Xu, Eat, Drink, Firms and Government: An Investigation of Corruptionfrom?
Entertainment Expenditures
of
Chinese
Firms
(Sept.
26,
2004),
http://ssrn.com/abstract-594961; Daniel C. K. Chow, Why China's Crackdown on
Commercial Bribery Threatens Multinational Companies in China, 31 ARIZ. J. INT'L
COMP. L. 511 (2014); Bin Dong & Benno Torgler, The Causes of Corruption: Evidence
from China (FEEM, Working Paper No. 72, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract-1628107;
Weili Ge, Zining Li, Qiliang Liu & Sarah E. McVay, When Does Internal Control Over
Financial Reporting Curb Resource Extraction? Evidence from China (2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2704663; Herschel I. Grossman & C. Simon Fan, Incentives and
Corruption in Chinese Economic Reform (2000), http://ssm.com/abstract=261701;
Robert Harmel & Yao-Yuan Yeh, Corruption and Government Satisfaction in
Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of China, APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper (Aug. 3,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract=1899973; Hilary K. Josephs,
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Journal reports that one 2014 survey indicates that "64% of China's
rich--defined as those with assets more than $1.6 million-are either
emigrating or planning to." 29
It appears that "First-generation
businessmen-the ones who powered China's economic rise-now
dream of a secure retirement. That means legal safety in places like the
U.S. and Canada." 3 0 And, "[s]ome of the wealth sluicing out of China is
undoubtedly ill-gotten gains. The Chinese central bank estimates that
corrupt officials may have siphoned off as much as $123 billion since the
mid-1990s."3 1
China recognizes that bribery and corruption are major threats to
societal growth and stability. 32
Professor Fu Hualing observes,
"[t]hrough anti-corruption campaigns, emerging political leaders
consolidate their political power, secure loyalty from political factions
and regional political forces, and enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of
the general public."3 3 Professor Fu Hualing continues:

The Upright and the Low-Down: An Examination of Official Corruption in the United
States and the People'sRepublic of China, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 269 (2000);
Ling Li, 'Performing'Bribery in China-Guanxi-Practice, Corruption with a Human

Face, 20 J.

CONTEMPORARY CHINA 1

(2011), http://ssm.com/abstract-1712390; Wei Li,

&

Corruption and Resource Allocation: Evidence from China (Darden Business School,
Working Paper No. 01-18, William Davidson Institute, Working Paper No. 396, 2001),
http://ssm.com/abstract-282523; Allan Verman Yap Ong, Note, The Rise of the
Prosecutorial Efforts in Foreign Corruption: Lessons Learned from Recent FCPA Cases
(Mar. 24, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1577444; Carlos D.
Ramirez, Is Corruption in China 'Out of Control'? A Comparison with the U.S. In
HistoricalPerspective (George Mason Univ. Dept. of Econ., Working Paper No. 12-60,
2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2185166; Susan Rose-Ackerman & Yingqi Tan,
Corruption in the Procurement of Pharmaceuticalsand Medical Equipment in China:
The Incentives Facing Multinationals, Domestic Firms and Hospital Officials (Yale Law
& Economics Research Paper No. 498, 2014), http://ssm.com/abstract-2444738; Cindy
A. Schipani, Junhai Liu & Haiyan Xu, Doing Business in a ConnectedSociety: The GSK
Bribery Scandal in China, 2016 U. ILL. L. REv. ONLINE 63 (2016), http://ssm
.com/abstract-2579040; Lawrence J. Trautman, American Entrepreneur in China:
Potholes and Roadblocks on the Silk Road to Prosperity, 12 WAKE FOREST J. Bus.
INTELL. PROP. L. 425 (2012); Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price,

The

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Minefield for Directors, 6 VA L. & Bus. REv. 145
(2011); Lawrence J. Trautman, U.S. Entrepreneurial Risk in International Markets:
Focus on Bribery and Corruption (Feb. 6, 2017) (unpublished paper) (on file with
author), https://ssm.com/abstract-2912072.
29. Andrew Browne, The Great Chinese Exodus, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2014,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-great-chinese-exodus-1408120906.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See generally Margaret K. Lewis, Presuming Innocence, or Corruption, in
China, 50 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 287 (2012).
33. Fu Hualing, Wielding the Sword: President Xi's New Anti-Corruption
Campaign, in GREED, CORRUPTION, AND THE MODERN STATE: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL
ECONOMY 134, 134 (Susan Rose-Ackerman and Paul Felipe Lagunes eds., 2015).
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In the modem world, economic prosperity, social stability and
effective control of corruption often provide adequate compensation
for a deficit of democracy. Corruption closely correlates with
While a perceived pervasive, endemic corruption
legitimacy.
undermines the legitimacy of a regime, a successful anti-corruption
campaign can allow a regime to recover from a crisis of
legitimacy ....
This is the rationale behind the periodical campaigns against
corruption that have been conducted by the Chinese Communist
Party ('Party'). Political leaders in China have found it expedient to
use anti-corruption campaigns to remove their political foes, to rein
in the bureaucracy and to restore public confidence in their ability to
rule. 34

Columbia University professor Andrew J. Nathan observes that
China's president and general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party
Xi Jinping's "anticorruption campaign has made him numerous enemies,
and there have been rumors of assassination attempts . . . . He uses ...
charges of corruption rather than screaming Red Guards and accusations
of revisionism to purge rivals . . . ."35 In addition,
Xi holds office at a time when the regime has to confront a series of
daunting challenges that have all reached critical stages at once. It
must manage a slowing economy; mollify millions of laid-off
workers; shift demand from export markets to domestic consumption;
whip underperforming giant state-owned enterprises into shape;
dispel a huge overhang of bad bank loans and nonperforming
investments; ameliorate climate change and environmental
devastation that are irritating the new middle class; and downsize and
upgrade the military.36
5.

Russian President Vladimir V. Putin

Friends of Russian president Vladimir Putin ''have shuffled $2
billion through a network of banks and offshore firms, the ICIJ claims." 37
Former Moscow correspondent for The Guardian, Luke Harding, along
with a team of reporters, "uncovered a web of more than 100 complex
international transactions that revolved around an offshore firm linked to
34. Id. (citations omitted).
35. Andrew J. Nathan, Who Is Xi?, N.Y. REv. BOOKS (May 12, 2016), http://www.
nybooks.com/ articles/2016/05/12/who-is-xi/.
36. Id.
37. Leak of the Century: The Lesson of the Panama Papers, EcoNoMIST (Apr. 9,
2016), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21696532-more-should-be-done-makeoffshore-tax-havens-less-murky-lesson-panama-papers?zid=305&ah=417bd5664dc7
6da5d98af4f7a640fd8a [hereinafter Leak of the Century).
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a musician named Sergei Roldugin, who is one of Mr. Putin's closest
friends." 38 Reporter Harding continues about the suspected connection
between Mr. Roldugin and Mr. Putin by observing that "' [w]e knew
money was being sent offshore from Russian state banks and being
Mr. Roldugin, who has the distinction
recycled back into Russia ....
of being a cellist and godfather to one of President Putin's daughters,
also owns "a 12.5% stake in Russia's once largest television-advertising
agency (which has reportedly never disclosed its ownership); another
3.9% of Bank Rossiya, on which American imposed sanctions after
Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014. American officials have described
Rossiya as Mr. Putin's personal bank." 4 0
British newspaper The Guardian reported that "Vladimir Putin has
offered his first response to the revelations in the Panama Papers,
describing their publication as an attempt to destabilize Russia and
saying there was no proof of corruption in the dossiers." 41 It will likely
come as no surprise that "[p]ublic opinion surveys indicate that
corruption remains the Achilles' heel of the current Russian
administration, because it seriously undermines public confidence in
Russia's political system."42 The Russian government during recent
years "has undertaken significant anti-corruption efforts in line with
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
World .Trade Organization (WTO), and World Bank policy
recommendations, but the results of such efforts at the company level are
far from encouraging."4 3 In discussing Russian corruption, Shaun
McGirr states that "[r]eport after report quantifies losses to the public
purse resulting from corruption.

. . ."4

Citing the official report from

38. Nicola Clark, How a Cryptic Message, 'Interestedin Data?,'Led to the Panama
Papers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/business
/media/how-a-cryptic-message-interested-in-data-led-to-the-panama-papers.html?action=
click&contentCollection.
39. Id.
40. The Furorefrom the PanamaPapers Will Only Grow Bigger, EcONOMIST (Apr.
5, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/intemational/21696240-huge-fallout-expected
-panama-documentsleak?spc=scode&spv=xm&ah=9d7f7ab945510a56fa6d37c30b6fl709.
41. Alec Luhn & Luke Harding, Putin Dismisses PanamaPapers as an Attempt to
Destabilise Russia, GUARDIAN, Apr. 7, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/news/
2016/apr/07/putin-dismisses-panama-papers-as-an-attempt-to-destabilise-russia.
42. Kirill Rogov, Russia's Economy in April 2013: PreliminaryData and Major
Trends, RUSSIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2271071.
43. Stanislav Shekshnia, Alena Ledeneva & Elena Denisova-Schmidt, How to
Mitigate Corruption in Emerging Markets: The Case of Russia 5 (Edmond J. Safra,
Working Papers No. 36, 2014), http://ssm.com/abstract-2391950.
44. Shaun McGirr, Note, Deliberate Indiscretion: Why BureaucraticAgencies are
Differently Corrupt, APSA Annual Meeting Paper; American Political Science
Association 2013 Annual Meeting, 1 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2299504.
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the Russian Audit Chamber, "'[w]e estimate losses from corruption in
public procurement amounted to US$30 billion in 2012,' .
(approximately 7% of total government expenditures, and 17% of
procurement expenditures)." 45 Moreover,
When Putin inevitably and repeatedly fails in his grand crusade to rid
the Russian state of corruption once and for all, the vast majority of
citizens do not blame him. Instead, they correctly understand the
technical impossibility of the task he set himself and then infer that
failure must be the fault of his underlings. Survey after survey
confirms that Russians know that illegal extraction from the state by
senior bureaucrats is rife. A plurality want harsh punishments for
these officials. And yet for university graduates in business-related
fields, the top-ten list of most-desired employers is littered with stateowned companies that present opportunities for corruption . . 46
In February 2016, Alexi Navalny, a Russian opposition leader and
anti-corruption campaigner, "filed a lawsuit against Vladamir Putin after
a company in which the Russian leader's son-in-law is a shareholder
received $1.75 billion in state support . .. [alleging] Putin had violated
Russian corruption laws by failing to declare a conflict of interest when
he personally approved the financing."4 7 Navalny's lawsuit is based on
"a Reuters investigation reporting that Putin's son-in-law, Kirill
Shamalov, is a major shareholder in petrochemicals producer Sibur,
which received the funding from Russia's National Wealth Fund at an
unusually low interest rate last year." 48 Navalny posted on his blog that
"Kirill Shamalov is the spouse of Putin's daughter. Putin giving money

&

45. Id. (citations omitted).
46. Id. For more scholarly work about Russian corruption, see Anna Balsevich
Elena A. Podkolzina, Indicators of Corruptionin Public Procurement: The Example of
Russian Regions 18-19 (Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP
76/EC/2014, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2530518 ("[C]orruption has a great negative
influence on procurement"); Ethan S. Burger & Mary Holland, Law as Politics: The
Russian Procuracyand its Investigative Committee 142, 143, 177 (NYU School of Law,
Public Law Research Paper No. 08-39, 2008) (arguing that the Russian Presidential
Administration created the Procuracy's important new Investigative Committee for
corrupt political purposes and has played a role in expropriating private property and
promoted illusory anti-corruption campaigns), http://ssm.com/abstract=41104700; Ethan
S. Burger, Following Only Some of the Money in Russia 41 (Georgetown Law and
Economics Research Paper No. 10-01, 2009), http://ssm.com/abstract-1543240;
Anastasiia Rassadovskaia & Andrey Aistov, Corruption Perceptions in Russia:
Economic or Social Issue? (Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP
57/EC/2014, 2014) (concluding that Russian grassroots bribery exists by force of habit
dating to Soviet times), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2423708.
47. Reuters, Alexi Navalny Files Lawsuit Against Putin Over Alleged Conflict of
Interest, GUARDIAN, Feb. 11, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/l1/
alexei-navalny-files-lawsuit-vladimir-putin.
48. Id.
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to a company when the beneficiary is his child's partner. is a classic
conflict of interest."4 9 Also in February 2016, "[t]he European court of
human rights has ruled that Russia's conviction of opposition leader and
blogger Alexi Navalny on charges of embezzlement was 'prejudicial,'
saying he had been deprived of a fair trial."o This follows Navalny's
conviction for "embezzling C400,000 during a 2009 ... business deal ...
with the courts convicting [him] one day after Navalny registered as a
candidate for the Moscow mayoral elections." 5
To better understand life in present-day Russia, it may be helpful to
recall that the collapse of the Soviet Union "brought economic
uncertainty to many. The move towards a market-based system left
many without work, on reduced hours or waiting many months for
wages ... between January 1991 and January 1993 the real average wage
had fallen by half and hyper-inflation wiped out savings."52. Estimates by
the Russian government about those citizens forced to. live on incomes
below the subsistence level are: 1992 (24% of the population); 1995
(33%); 2005 (24%); although fallen during 2008 (13%, about 10 million
people); but for Moscow during 2008 (23%).53 Professors Round and
Williams report that "[1]ow pay was particularly common within the state
sector, where teachers, medical staff, and many. state bureaucrats
received incomes below. the subsistence minimum. .

Many workers

also experienced periods. when wages went unpaid."5 4 Round and
Williams describe how the post-Soviet economy. created. a culture
conducive to everyday bribery and corruption as follows:
Given the shortage economies that developed from the 1960s, even
relatively trivial needs, such as a car repair or a new cooker, required
a lengthy wait. Therefore, the use of informal networks to bypass
such shortages rose as the Soviet economy ground to a halt. Given
that there was little to buy in the shops, charging people for an
informal service had relatively modest benefit. Instead, developing a
network of favours to be called upon in the future was of greater use,
giving rise to the saying 'it is better to have a hundred friends than a

49. Id.
50. Agence France-Presse, Russia's Conviction of OppositionLeader Alexi Navalny
'Arbitrary', European Court Says, GUARDIAN, Feb. 23, 2016, http://www.theguardian
.com/world/2016/feb/24/russias-convictionof-opposition-leader-alexei-navalnyarbitrary-european-court-says.
5 1. Id.
52. John Round & Colin C. Williams, Coping with the Social Costs of 'Transition':
Everyday Life in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine, 17(2) EuR. URB. & REGIONAL STUD.
183, 185 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2289927. See also Richard Rose, Corruption:
Perception vs. Experience in Russia (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154824.
53. Round & Williams, supra note 52, at 185.
54. Id.
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hundred roubles'. The Soviet Union's collapse, and the introduction
of market-style economies, saw a monetization of such behaviour, for
example the demanding of bribes for access to services. 55
One scholar reports that, in Russia, even "academic corruption is
tightly embedded into the general corruption in society: in politics,
business, and in everyday life." 56
B.

Tip of the Iceberg?

Other early, disclosures include those regarding:
oil contracts
benefiting a nephew of South Africa's president Jacob Zuma;5 ' Ukraine
President Petro Poroshenko's offshore company suggested to be a tax
haven; 8 information resulting in new criminal and internal investigations
about ongoing FIFA global soccer bribery and corruption; 59 disclosures
about offshore holdings by family members of Pakistan's Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif; 60 the offshore holdings of Spain's minister of industry,
resulting in his resignation; 6 1 and disclosure of offshore wealth held by
Ayad Allani, "the former interim prime minister and former vice
president of Iraq." 6 2
1.

South African President Jacob Zuma

Early 2016 appears' to have been difficult for South Africa's
President, Jacob Zuma. Just days after the Panama Papers revelations
became public, Zuma's nephew is reported by The Economist to have

55.. Id. at 188.
56. Elena Denisova-Schmidt, Justification of Academic . Corruption at Russian
Universities: A Student Perspective (Edmond J. Safra Working Papers No. 30, 2013),
http://ssm.com/abstract-2353513.
57. See Leak of the Century, supra note 37; South Africa Moment of Truth: Jacob
Zuma Has Survived A Ruling that he Broke the Law, but his Grip on the ANC is Slipping,
EcoNoMIST (Apr. 9, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/2169
6518-jacob-zuma-has-survived-ruling-he-broke-law-his-grip-anc [hereinafter Moment of
Truth].
58. Ukraine Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk to Resign, BBC NEws (Apr. 10,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36010511 [hereinafter Ukraine Prime
Minister].
59. See Rebecca R. Ruiz, After Panama Papers, A Raid at UEFA and New
Questions for FIFA, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07
/sports/soccer/panama-papers-raise-new-questions-for-fifa.html?_r-0.

60. See Martha M. Hamilton, Pakistan's PM Leaves Country, Spanish Minister
Resigns, THE INT'L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Apr. 15, 2016),
https://panamapapers.icij.org/20160415-pakistan-pressure-spain-resignation.html.
61. Id.
62. See Holly Watt, Panama Papers:
Global Tax Officials to Launch
Unprecedented Inquiry, GUARDIAN, Apr. 12, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/
news/2016/apr/12/panama-papers-global-tax-officials-inquiry-paris-meeting.
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done well "out of oil contracts in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
where South Africa has sent more than 1,000 peacekeepers. Ordinary
citizens are incensed. Mr. Zuma faced impeachment proceedings
immediately over allegations that he misappropriated public money to
build himself a palace and refused to pay it back." 6 3 This comes at a
time when Mr. Zuma's popularity among voters and control over his
political party appears to be experiencing severe pressure, as indicated in
a report by The Economist that "a court will soon decide whether to
reinstate some of the 783 charges of corruption, fraud, moneylaundering, and tax evasion against Mr. Zuma that were dropped shortly
before he came to power in 2009."64 On another front, "[a] union
representing 16,000 soldiers demanded that Mr. Zuma be removed and
urged its members to join 'mass action campaigns' against him.. .
With pressure mounting on Mr. Zuma, some fear the struggle may turn
nasty."

2.

65

Ukraine President Petro Poroshenko

Add Ukraine President Petro Poroshenko to the growing list of
world leaders who have become uncomfortable following the release of
the Panama Papers. The BBC reports that Poroshenko came "under
scrutiny ... after leaked documents suggested that he had set up an
offshore company as a tax haven."66 During 2015, Transparency
International writes about the Ukraine:
Following the parliamentary elections held in October 2014, a new
coalition agreement was signed, with anti-corruption reforms being
one of the key priorities . . . . However, the success of these reforms

is seriously jeopardised by the fact that the judiciary and law
enforcement agencies fail to effectively enforce the existing rules.
Failure to effectively investigate the alleged corruption offences
committed under the Yanukovych regime, the emergence of new
offences reported by the media during 2014, and the granting of
public contracts to companies allegedly engaged in corrupt practices
in recen ears all add to the sense of impunity which prevails in the
country.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Leak of the Century, supra note 37.
Moment of Truth, supra note 57.
Id.
Ukraine Prime Minister, supra note 58.
Andrew McDevitt, The State of Corruption: Armenia, Azerbayan, Georgia,

Moldova and Ukraine, TRANSPARENCY INT'L 25 (2015), http://www.transparency.org

/whatwedo/publication/the state of corruptionarmeniaazerbaijan georgia moldova a
nd ukraine.
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While significant anti-corruption reforms have been introduced in
the Ukraine, "an important gap remains the lack of an anti-corruption
agency, although such an agency is envisaged in the form of . . a
National Anti-Corruption Bureau and National Agency for Prevention of
Corruption." 6 8 As of 2015, Ukraine has what may best be described as
an unaccountable executive, where the president exercises strong
executive function control over governmental work, "including: the
power to determine foreign, national security and defense policy; to
propose candidates for. . . minister of defense and foreign minister; to
issue binding decrees; to appoint regional heads of regional and local
administrations; and to suspend any government decision he/she
considers to be inconsistent with the constitution." 69 The judiciary is
also subject to executive interference
in the form of alleged politically motivated appointments and
removal of judges. This in turn diminishes the ability of the judiciary
to hold the executive to account through effective judicial review,
since the courts are highly politicized . . . . It is not surprising,

therefore that 87 per cent of citizens perceive the judiciary to be
corrupt or extremely corrupt. 70
3.

FIFA Global Soccer Bribery and Corruption

After release of the Panama Papers, "Swiss authorities raided the
headquarters of the European soccer association in Nyon,
Switzerland ... seizing information on television rights contracts with
Argentine business executives implicated in the FIFA corruption
scandal."n The New York Times article further reported that "FIFA's
independent ethics committee confirmed that one of its ethics lawyers
was under internal investigation for a business relationship brought to
light by the Panama Papers." 72
On May 27, 2015, a 47-count indictment was unsealed by the
United States Department of Justice in the U.S. District Court for the
Fourteen defendants were charged in
Eastern District of New York.
this indictment with "racketeering, wire fraud and money laundering
conspiracies, among other offenses, in connection with the defendants'
participation in a 24-year scheme to enrich themselves through the

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 26-27.
Ruiz, supra note 59.
Id.
United States v. Jeffrey Webb et al., 15-CR-0252 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2015).
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corruption of international soccer." 74 On the same day, coordinated raids
were held by "United States and Swiss officials on FIFA facilities in
Miami and at 'FIA headquarters in Zurich. Swiss authorities also
conducted an early morning raid on Zurich's luxury Baur du Lac Hotel
arresting seven FIFA officials." 75
Known as soccer in the United States, "international football is the
world's most popular sport. It is played in every country, territory, and
remote island on the planet ... requiring no elaborate infrastructure, no
expensive equipment, and no extraordinary physical characteristics for
those who simply want to kick a ball toward a goal.. . . 7 According
to the DOJ,
FIFA is composed of 209 member associations, each representing
organized soccer in a particular nation or territory, including the
United States and four of its overseas territories. FIFA also
recognizes' six continental confederations that assist it in governing
soccer in different regions of the world. The U.S. Soccer Federation
is one of 41 member associations of the confederation known as
CONCACAF, which has been headquartered in the United States
throughout the period charged in the indictment. The South
American confederation, called CONMEBOL, is also a focus of the
indictment.
As alleged in the -indictment, FIFA and its six continental
confederations, together with affiliated regional federations, national
member associations and sports marketing companies, constitute an
enterprise of legal entities associated in fact for purposes of the
federal racketeering laws. The principal-and entirely legitimatepurpose of the enterprise is to regulate and promote the sport of
soccer worldwide.
As alleged in the indictment, one key way the enterprise derives
revenue is to commercialize the media and marketing rights
associated with soccer events and tournaments. The organizing entity
that owns those rights-as FIFA and CONCACAF do with respect to

74. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate
Executives Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption (May 27, 2015),
https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate-executives-indictedracketeering-conspiracy-and.
75. Bruce W. Bean, An Interim Essay on FIFA's World Cup of Corruption: The
DesperateNeed for InternationalCorporateGovernance Standardsat FIFA, 22 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 367, 367-68 (2016).
76. Id. at 372. See also Jeff Todd & R. Todd Jewell, Major League Soccer and the
Corrupted2022 FIFA World Cup Bidding: Proving Harm andRecovering Damages, 41
VERMONT L. REv. 23 (2016); Jeff Todd & R. Todd Jewell, Reclaiming Economic Legacy:
One Legal Strategy For A 2022 FIFA World Cup USA, 44 CAPITAL U. L. REv. 245
(2016).

2017]

FOLLOWING THE MONEY: LESSONS FROM THE PANAMA PAPERS

825

the World Cup and Gold Cup, their respective flagship
tournaments-sells them to sports marketing companies, often
through multi-year contracts covering multiple editions of the
tournaments. The sports marketing companies, in turn, sell the rights
downstream to TV and radio broadcast networks, major corporate
sponsors and other sub-licensees who want to broadcast the matches
or promote their brands. The revenue generated from these contracts
is substantial: according to FIFA, 70% of its $5.7 billion in total
revenues between 2011 and 2014 was attributable to. the sale of TV
77
and marketing rights to the 2014 World Cup.
In remarks given during her May 27, 2015 press conference to
announce these charges, then-Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch stated,
that "[b]eginning in 1991, two generations of soccer officials . . . used
their positions of trust within their respective organizations to solicit
bribes from sports marketers in exchange for the commercial rights to
their tournaments.
They did this over and over, year after year,
tournament after tournament."7 8 For example, in 2016, the United States
hosted the Copa America tournament. Attorney General Lynch says
"[o]ur investigation revealed that what should be an expression of
international sportsmanship was used as, a vehicle in a broader scheme to
line executives' pockets with bribes totaling $110 million-nearly a third
of the legitimate costs of the rights to the tournaments involved." 79
Attorney General Lynch continued.
In short, these individuals and organizations engaged in bribery to
decide who would televise games; where the games would be held;
and who would run the organization overseeing organized soccer
worldwide. While at least one FIFA executive served as
CONCACAF president without pay, there was little altruism
involved, as he alone is alleged to have taken more than $10 million
in bribes over a 19-year period and amassed a personal fortune from
his ill-gotten gains. In many instances, defendants and their coconspirators planned aspects of their scheme during meetings held
here in the United States; they used the banking and wire facilities of
the United States to distribute bribe payments; and they planned to
profit from their scheme in large part through promotional efforts
directed at the growing U.S. market for soccer.

77. See Press Release, supra note 74.
78. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch Delivers
Remarks at Press Conference Announcing Charges Against Nine FIFA Officials and Five
Corporate Executives (May 27, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorneygeneral-loretta-e-lynch-delivers-remarks-press-conference-announcing-charges.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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FIFA's own Ethics Committee took action on December 21, 2015,
to ban the organization's "long-serving president, Joseph 'Sepp' Blatter,
for eight years." 81 According to Boudreau, Karahan, and Coats, "[a]s a
monopolist in rule-making and holding a world championship
tournament for the world's most popular sport, FIFA executives and
board members are in a position to demand payoffs and/or can punish its
adversaries with its venue selection or by banning national teams from
tournament participation." 82 Just days before release of the Panama
Papers,
Rafael Callejas, the president of the Honduran soccer federation
(FENAFUTH) from 2002 to 2015, pleaded guilty to racketeering
conspiracy and wire fraud conspiracy in connection with his receipt
of bribes in exchange for the awarding of contracts for the media and
marketing rights to FIFA World Cup qualifier matches. Callejas,
who served as the President of the Republic of Honduras from 1990
to 1994, also agreed to forfeit $650,000. At sentencing, Callejas
faces a maximum sentence of 20 years for each count.83
By April 18, 2016, The Wall Street Journal had reported that
"[s]eventeen of the 42 people publicly charged have pleaded guilty ...
[and that] U.S. officials hope the [Panama Papers] documents detail
money flows and entities involved in the alleged scheme.
".84
4.

Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif

Panama Papers files examined by the International Consortium of
International Journalists and its partners revealed that "[i]n Pakistan,
opponents of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, including retired cricket star
and politician Imran Khan, hammered him with demands that the
country's corruption watchdog open an investigation . . . . Sharif

announced that he would do so. Three of his children owned London

81. Christopher J. Boudreau, Gkhan Karahan & R. Morris Coats, Bend it like FIFA:
Corruption on and off the Pitch, MANAGERIAL FIN. 1 (Jan. 14, 2016),
http://ssm.com/abstract-2719718.
82. Id.
83. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former President of Honduran Soccer
Fed'n Pleads Guilty to Racketeering and Corruption Charges (Mar. 28, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/former-president-honduran-soccer-federationpleads-guilty-racketeering-and-corruption. See also Bruce W. Bean, FIFA Has Made the
'Beautiful Game' Ugly (Sept. 21, 2015) (providing important documents about the FIFA
criminal proceeding; including full text of the Indictment, the criminal laws charged, the
FIFA Statutes, and current Code of Ethics), http://ssm.com/abstract=2663789.
84. Christopher M. Matthews, Aruna Viswanatha & Joe Flint, Focus Shifts in FIFA
Probe, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 2016, at Bl.
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real estate through offshore companies."" In developments reported just
a few days later, "Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, facing calls for his
resignation as a result of his family's holdings in offshore companies,
checked himself into a London hospital . .. setting off speculation that he
might not return to Pakistan until the furore dies down." 86 Bribery and
corruption in Pakistan has received the attention of many scholars.
Resignation of Spain's Minister of Industry

5.

When the Panama Papers first came to light, Spain's Minister of
Industry Jos6 Manuel Soria "vehemently denied any ties to an offshore
company cited in the Panama Papers and reported by online newspaper
El Confidencial and television station La Sexta." 88 Minister Manuel
Soria is reported to have said, "I totally deny that I have anything to do

Martha M. Hamilton, PanamaPapers Hit PoliticalAgendas Around the World,

85.

JOURNALISTS
(Apr. 6, 2016),
CONSORTIUM
OF INVESTIGATIVE
https://panamapapers.icij.org/blog/20160406-world-leaders-reactions.html.
86. Id.
87. See generally, Alia Ahmed & Munir Ahmad, Accountability Structures: A
THE

INT'L

Comparative Analysis, CITIZENS' PERIODIC REP. ON THE PERFORMANCE OF STATE INST.,

PILDAT REP. (2015), http://ssm.com/abstract-2592040;M. Shahid Alam, Corruption

&

and CountervailingAction in Pakistan, POL. DIMENSION OF EcoN. GROWTH (S. Borner,
M. Paldam, M. Kaser, eds., Palgrave, 1998), http://ssm.com/abstract-2270141; Saad
Siddique Bajwa, A ComparativeAnalysis ofAnti-Money Laundering Law in the United
Kingdom and Pakistan (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2372983; Sheheryar Banuri
Catherine C. Eckel, Cracking Down on Bribery, 45 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE (2015),

http://ssrn.com/abstract-2212713;

Michael Joseph Callen, Saad Gulzar, Syed Ali

Hasanain & Muhammad Yasir Khan, The Political Economy of Public Employee
Absence: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract-231

6245; Katharina Gangl, Erich Kirchler, Christian Lorenz & Benno Torgler, Wealthy Tax
Non-Filers in a Developing Country: Taxpayer Knowledge, PerceivedCorruption and
Service Orientation in Pakistan (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2643456; Zahid
Hasnain, Devolution, Accountability, and Service Delivery: Some Insightsfrom Pakistan

(World

Bank

Policy

Res.,

Working

Paper

No.

4610,

2008),
&

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 149113; Jonathan Jackson, Muhammad Asif, Ben Bradford
Muhammad Zakria Zakar, Corruption and Police Legitimacy in Lahore, Pakistan (Apr. 6,

&

2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2421036; Asim Ijaz Khwaja

Atif R. Mian, Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an
Emerging FinancialMarket, 120 Q. J. ECON. (2005), http://ssm.com/abstract=901943;
Muhammad Munir, Trafficking in Persons: Faulty Regulations, Pervasive Corruption
and Flawed Policing in Pakistan (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2508880; Lorenzo
Pellegrini, The Rule of the Jungle in Pakistan: A Case Study on Corruptionand Forest
2007),
91,
No.
Paper
Working
(FEEM
Swat
in
Management

http://ssrn.com/abstract-1017233; Nabeel M. Saleheen, Pakistan: A Collapsed State
(May 10, 2013) (unpublished thesis) (on file with the Marymount University),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2263077; Muhammad Sohail, Muhammad Arslan & Rashid
Zaman, The Impact of Corruption on Firm Performance: Evidence from Pakistan, 4
PUB. POL'Y & ADMIN. RESEARCH 121 (2014) http://ssm.com/abstract=2515045.
88. See Hamilton, supra note 60.
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with any company based in Panama, or any other tax haven."89
However, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and
its partners reported that "Spanish media caught the minister in a series
of lies about his involvement in offshore companies, which culminated
with newspaper El Mundo proving the minister was director of a Jerseybased company up to 2002, when he was already into politics."9 0
Although Minister Manuel Soria has not been accused of wrong-doing,
he resigned "because of 'the succession of mistakes committed along the
past few days, relating to my explanations over nmy business activities ...
and considering the obvious harm that this situation is doing to the
Spanish government."' 91
C.

ICIJ Year-Long Effort ofResearch andAnalysis

The genesis of the Panama Papers saga began in early 2015 with a
cryptic message sent to a Munich-based newspaper, Silddeutsche
Zeitung, known for having worked on money-laundering and tax evasion
scandals. 92 After about. two months of working on the massive
documents, Siddeutsche's five-person investigations team was
overwhelmed with the enormity of the task and reached out to The
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) for help. 93
The ICIJ is "a nineteen-year-old subsidiary of a nonprofit news
organization in Washington called the Center for Public Integrity." 94
Founded in 1997, the ICIJ describes itself as "a global network of more
than 190 investigative journalists in more than 65 countries who
collaborate on in-depth investigative stories."95 As a collaborative
response to the recent news industry's plight of slashed budgets and
dismantled investigative teams, the ICIJ's stated aim is to "bring
journalists from different countries together in teams-eliminating
rivalry and promoting collaboration." 96 "The I.C.I.J. has only eleven
full-time employees.",r However, "[w]ithin weeks, the ICIJ had
assembled an army of about 400 journalists from more than 100 news
organizations in 80 countries, including The Guardian and BBC in
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Clark, supra note 38.
93. Id.
94. Nicholas Lemann, The PanamaPapers and the Monster Stories of the Future,
NEW YORKER (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-panamapapers-and-the-monster-stories-of-the-future.
95 About The ICIJ, THE INT'L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Feb.
13, 2012), https://www.icij.org/about (last viewed Mar. 5, 2017).
96. Id.
97. Lemann, supra note 94.
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Britain, the French daily Le Monde, the Sonntagszeitung in Switzerland,
and L'Espresso, an Italian weekly newsmagazine." 9 8
A common strategy was required for collaboration of parsing out
the research to such a large group of people simultaneously examining
the same database. Resources at the ICIJ included about a dozen fulltime staffers, plus freelancers-and
The ICIJ made a number of powerful research tools available to the
consortium that the group had developed for previous leak
investigations. Those included a secure, Facebook-type forum where
reporters could post the fruits of their research, as well as a database
search program called "Blacklight" that allowed the teams to hunt for
99
specific names, countries or sources.
Also required was a promise by all involved to withhold publishing
"until everyone was ready."100
ICIJ's epic Panama Papers investigation benefitted from their
experience with an earlier set of data leaked to France's leading
newspaper Le Monde.10 While at Harvard's Shorenstein Center on
Media, Politics, and Public Policy, award winning journalist Bill
Buzenberg describes Le Monde's 2014 dilemma about to proceed with an
investigation involving 120,000 named potential tax avoiders
worldwide. 10 2 The disclosures involved HSBC's (formerly known as
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Corporation) Swiss Private Bank, and
"current and former politicians from Britain, Russia, Ukraine, Georgia,
Kenya, Romania, India, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Tunisia, Congo,
Paraguay, Senegal, the Philippines and many others."l 03 Journalist
Buzenberg reports that "Le Monde's leak was based on documents stolen
in 2006 and 2007 by a computer technician then working for the HSBC
Swiss private bank in Geneva." 1 04 Involving up to "170 reporters
[c]ountry by country, the
working for 65 media organizations ...
investigation showed how HSBC profited from laundering money for
drug cartels and blood diamond dealers, how it did business with tax

98.
99.
100.
101.

Clark, supra note 38.
Id.
Id.
See William E. Buzenberg, Anatomy of a Global Investigation: Collaborative,

Data-Driven, Without Borders, HARv. KENNEDY SCH. SHORENSTEIN CTR. ON MEDIA,

POLITICS & PUB. POL'Y DiscussIoN PAPER SER. #D-94, 3 (2015), http://shorens
teincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Anatomy-of-a-Global-Investigation-WilliamBuzenberg.pdf.
102.

Id.

at 4.

See also Bill Buzenberg,

THE CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY,

https://www.publicintegrity.org/authors/bill-buzenberg (last viewed Feb. 28, 2017).
103. Buzenberg, supra note 101, at 4.
104. Id.
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dodgers and criminals, how it transferred funds for Iran and other
blacklisted countries."10 5
D.

Mossack Fonseca

By April 4, 2016, leaked confidential documents from the
Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca had received global focus
because "[they] exposed how some of the world's most powerful people
were said to have used offshore bank accounts to conceal their wealth or
avoid taxes." 1 0 6 Exhibit 3 illustrates that the "number of active
companies managed by Mossack Fonseca peaked in 2009, with almost
82,000, and have since been in decline." 0 7
Exhibit 3
Offshore Companies Actively Managed by Mossack Fonseca
Since 1977
80,000
60,000
40,000

20,000
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Source: The Panama Papers 08

International Consortium of Investigative Journalists
Founded in 1986 by Jilrgen Mossack and Ram6n Fonseca, the law firm
"has become a global behemoth-hundreds of employees spread around
the world, with special expertise in creating tax shelters for wealthy
global elites. The firm is also, according to documents in the 'Panama
Papers,' deeply involved with all manner of unsavory and possibly

105. Id. at 5.
106. What are the Panama Papers?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/05/world/panama-papers-explainer.html?_r-0.
107. Carvajal et al., supra note 5 (stating that offshore companies are normally only
active for a short amount of time).
108. See id.
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illegal practices across continents . . . ."109 Please note, as more fully
covered below,1 0 that Mossack Fonseca has strenuously denied any
wrongdoing. Also, within weeks of the initial disclosures, Mossack
Fonseca announced its aggressive legal action plan against the ICIJ in
response to the data leaks."'
The firm Mossack Fonseca dates back to 1977 when recent law
school graduate Ram6n Fonseca, after spending six years in Geneva
working for the United Nations, returned to Panama City and launched
his law practice with one secretary.11 2 Law partner Ram6n Fonseca is
politically active, serving as minister counselor to Ricardo Martinelli,
Panama's president during the 1990s, and is "close to Panama's current
president, Juan Carlos Varela, and part of his informal kitchen
cabinet.""1
Soon after first accounts of revelations from the Panama Papers,
Mossack Fonseca had posted to its website a "Statement Regarding
Recent Media Coverage," stating that "recent media reports have
portrayed an inaccurate view of the services that we provide and, despite
our efforts to correct the record, misrepresented the nature of our work
and its role in global financial markets."' "4 The Statement continues:
These reports rely on supposition and stereotypes, and play on the
public's lack of familiarity with the work of firms like ours. The
unfortunate irony is that the materials on which these reports are
based actually show the high standards we operate under, specifically
that:
* we conduct due diligence on clients at the outset of a potential
engagement and on an ongoing basis;
* we routinely deny services to individuals who are compromised or
who fail to provide information we need in order to comply with
109. David A. Graham, What is Mossack Fonseca, the Law Firm in the Panama
Papers?, ATLANTIC, (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/intemational/archive/2
01 6/04/panama-papers-mossack-fonseca/476727/.
110. See infra App. 1.
111. See Vasudevan Sridharan, Mossack Fonseca to Begin 'Aggressive Legal Action'
Against ICIJ Over Panama Papers, INT'L. Bus. TIMES (May 12, 2016), http://www.
ibtimes.co.uk/mossack-fonseca-begin-aggressive-legal-action-against-icij-over-panamapapers-1559622.
112. See Juliette Garside, Luke Harding, Holly Watt, David Pegg, Helena Bengtsson,
Simon Bowers, Owen Gibson and Nick Hopkins, Mossack Fonseca: Inside the Firm that
Helps the Super-Rich Hide Their Money, GUARDIAN, Apr. 8, 2016,
http://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/08/mossack-fonseca-law-firm-hide-moneypanama-papers.
113. Id.
114. Statement Regarding Recent Media Coverage, MOSSACK FONSECA, 1 (Apr. 1,
2016), http://mossfonmedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Statement-Regarding-Rece
nt-Media-Coverage 4-1-2016.pdf.
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"know your client" obligations or when we identify other red flags
through our due diligence;
* we routinely resign from client engagements when ongoing due
diligence and/or updates to sanctions lists reveals that a party to a
company for which we provide services been either convicted or
listed by a sanctioning body;
* we routinely comply with requests from authorities investigating
companies or individuals for whom we are providing services; and
* we work with established intermediaries, such as investment banks,
accountancies and law finns, as part of the regulated global financial
115
system.
While the Mossack Fonseca "Statement Regarding Recent Media
Coverage," dated April 1, 2016, is reproduced in its entirety as Appendix
One,116
a portion of this descriptive language regarding services
provided to clients may be of interest to many taxing authorities around
the world:
(h) Backdated Documents: The issuance of documents with a
retroactive date is a well-founded and accepted practice when the
decisions made with regard to the particular document are recorded in
resolutions approved before or when the transaction in particular has
taken place and the formalization is still pending. Such practice is
common in our industry and its aim is not to cover up or hide
unlawful acts.1 1 7

E.

Not All Are Involved in Illegal Activity

Financial and currency crises are a constant threat in many parts of
the world.' 18 All those who move their honestly-obtained personal assets

&

115. Id.
116. Id
117. Id. at 4.
118. See Graham Bird & Ramkishen S. Rajan, Restraining International Capital
Movements: What Does It Mean? (Ctr. Int'l Econ. Stud. Working Paper No. 14, 2000),
http://ssm.com/abstract-231207; Benedict Clements & Herman Kamil, Are Capital
Controls Effective in the 21st Century? The Recent Experience of Colombia (IMF,
Working Paper No. 09/30, 2009), http://ssm.com/abstract-1356459; Kristin J. Forbes
Michael W. Klein, Pick Your Poison: The Choices and Consequences of Policy
Responses to Crises (MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 5062-13, 2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract-2364457; Michael M. Hutchison & Reuven Glick, Capital
Controls andExchange Rate Instabilityin Developing Economies (UCSC Dept. of Econ.,

Working Paper No. 489, 2000), http://ssm.com/abstract-288843; Hiro Ito, Is Financial
Openness a Bad Thing? An Analysis on the Correlation Between Financial
Liberalization and the Output Performance of Crisis-HitEconomies (UCSC Int'l Econ.,

&

Working Paper No. 04-23, 2004), http://ssm.com/abstract-621801; Carmen Reinhart

Kenneth Rogoff, Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises: Some Lessons Learned and
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away from their home country have not committed an illegal or immoral

act.

Similarly, all names appearing in the Panama Papers are not

involved in criminal activity.

Imagine that you and your family are

citizens of a country plagued with a history of political and/or currency
instability. To protect your family from financial ruin, it seems logical
and reasonable that you will seek to diversify your assets away from such
known risks. We all examine issues of bribery, corruption, tax
avoidance, and tax evasion through a lens shaped by our own individual
and cultural experiences. Those who have not traveled extensively may
not understand the extent to which currency restrictions are prevalent in
many countries and devaluations are a real threat to many in their daily
lives.
Readers fortunate enough to live in a country having stable
economic conditions may not appreciate the daily struggle encountered
by those facing perceived threats of. currency devaluations, land
expropriation, or political instability. Consider the following examples
of abrupt regime change: Brazil (2016);119 Burmese coup (1962);120
Chad; 12 1 Cuba (1959);122 collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
(1990);123 Egypt (2013);124 Iran (1979);125 Iraq (2003);126 Russian

Those Forgotten (IMF, Working Paper No. 13/266, 2013), http://ssm.com/abstra
ct-2387533.
119. See Paulo Trevisani & Reed Johnson, New Brazilian Leader Faces Rocky Path,
WALL ST.

J., May 13, 2016, at A6.

See Myint Zan, A Comparison of the First and Fiftieth Year of Independent
Burma's Law Reports, 35 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 385 (2004) (NZ).
121. See Achille Toto Same, Windfall Management for Poverty Reduction:
Improving Public Finance Management-The Case of Chad (WBG, Pol'y Res. Working
Paper No. 4569, 2008), http://ssm.com/abstract=1 149099.
122. See generally Jon L. Mills & Daniel Ryan Koslosky, Whither Communism: A
Comparative Perspective on Constitutionalismin a PostsocialistCuba, 40 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 1219 (2009); HUGH THOMAS, THE CUBAN REVOLUTION (1977) (discussing
events preceding and following the 1959 Cuban Revolution); Kurt Weyland, The
Diffusion of Authoritarian Rule: An Analysis of Causal Mechanisms 1-50 (2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n.), http://ssm.com
/abstract-2299101.
123. See Fred Eidlin, Some Thoughts on the Collapse of the GDR and its
Consequences, in GERMAN MONITOR-GERMANY AFTER UNIFICATION: COMING TO
TERMS WITH THE RECENT PAST, 101-07 (Gert-Joachim Glaessner ed., 1997); Jakub J.
Szczerbowski & Paulina Piotrowska, Measures to Dismantle the Heritageof Communism
in Eastern and Central Europe: Human Rights' Context, in 62/63 CUADERNOS
CONSTITUCIONALES DE LA CATEDRA FADRIQUE FURIO CERIOL 233-48 (2010); Daniel
Munich, Jan Svenjar & Katherine Terrell, Returns to Human Capital under the
Communist Wage Grid and During the Transition to a Market Economy (Inst. Study of
Lab., Discussion Paper No. 122, 2000), http://ssrn.com/abstract-224229.
124. See Thomas M. McDonnell, The Egyptian Coup, the United States, and a Call to
Strengthen the Rule ofLaw and Diplomacy Rather than Military Counter-Terrorism,41
N.C. J. INT'L L. 326, 365-75 (2016).
120.
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Revolution (1917);127 former Yugoslavia (1990s);1 2 8 and assorted crisis
situations in Afghanistan, 12 9 Congo,13 0 Haiti,131 Ivory Coast,1 3 2 Liberia,1 33
125. See generally Victor H. Sundquist, IranianDemocratizationPartI: A Historical
Case Study of the Iranian Green Movement, 6 U. S. FL. J. STRATEGIC SECURITY 19

(2013); McDonnell, supra note 124.
126. See generally Linda Bilmes & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Economic Costs of the Iraq
War:

An Appraisal Three Years after the Beginning of the Conflict (Harv. KSG,

Working Paper No. 06-002, 2006), http://ssm.com/abstract-832646; Andrew Leigh,
Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, What do FinancialMarkets Think of War in Iraq? (Stan.

GSB, Research Paper No. 1785, 2003), http://ssm.com/abstract-388762; William D.
Nordhaus, The Economic Consequences of a War with Iraq (Cowles Foundation,

Discussion Paper No. 1387, 2002), http://ssrn.com/abstract-357723; George Selgin,
Synthetic Commodity Money 1-28 (Apr. 10, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Cato Inst.), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2000118; Yochanan Shachmurove,
FinancialMarkets of the Middle East and North Africa: The Past andPresent (Penn Ins.

Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 03-017, 2003), http://ssm.com/abstract=419780; John
Yoo, InternationalLaw andthe War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'LL. 563 (2003).

127.
128.

See Weyland, supra note 122.
See Valentin Cojanu & Alina-Irina Popescu, Analysis of Failed States: Some

Problems ofDefinition and Measurement, 25 ROM. ECON. J. 113 (2007) (Rom.); Diane
Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure in an

InternationalContext, 75 IND. L. J. 810, 841 (2000).
129. See generally Kenneth Anderson, Humanitarian Inviolability in Crisis: The
Meaning ofImpartiality and Neutralityfor U.N. And Ngo Agencies Following the 2003-

2004 Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts, 17 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 41 (2004); Niccolo Leo
Caldararo, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram and Forms of Rebellion in the 21st Century in
the Vacuum of Ottoman Soviet 'Collapse', 2-36 (Sep. 9, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2494027.
130. See generally Susan Rice, Corinne Graff & Janet I. Lewis, Poverty and Civil
War: What Policymakers Need to Know (Brookings Global Econ. & Dev., Working
Paper No. 2, 2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract-1015091.

131.
132.

Id.
Id.

133.

See Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Persistence of Power, Elites, and

Institutions

(MIT

Dep't

Econ.,

Working

Paper

No.

06-05,

2006),

http://ssm.com/abstract=888187;
Christopher Blattman & Jeannie Annan, Can
Employment Reduce Lawlessness and Rebellion? A Field Experiment with High-Risk

Men in a Fragile State (NBER, Working Paper No. 21289, 2015),
http://ssm.com/abstract-2431293 (observing that Liberia's war ended in 2003); Deval
Desai, Deborah Isser, & Michael Woolcock, Rethinking Justice Reform in Fragile and
Conflict-Affected States: The Capacity of Development Agencies and Lessons from
Liberia and Afghanistan, in 3 WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW: INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL

INSTITUTIONS AND GLOBAL LEGAL GOVERNANCE 241 (Daniel D. Bradlow et al. eds.,
World Bank 2011); James D. Fearon, Macartan Humphreys & Jeremy M. Weinstein,
Development Assistance, Institution Building, and Social Cohesion after Civil War:
Evidence from a Field Experiment in Liberia (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No.

&

194, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract-1517941; Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, 71 L.

CONTEMP. PROBS. 101, 101-133 (2007); Zachary D. Kaufman, The Future of
TransitionalJustice, 1 ST. ANTONY'S INT'L REv. 58, 58-81 (2005) (Eng.); Lant Pritchett,
Michael Woolcock & Matthew Andrews, Capability Traps? The Mechanisms of
PersistentImplementation Failure (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 234, 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1824519; Willem van Genugten, UNPeacekeeping in Africa and
Good Governance: Challenges and Prospects, 11 POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC J. 1, 148 (2008) (S. Afr.); Patrick Vinck, Phuong Pham & Tino Kreutzer, HUM. RTS. CTR., U.
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Rwanda,' 3 4 and Sierra Leone. 13 5 More recently, examples of completely
failed states include Libyal 3 6 and Somalia.1 3 7
Professor Graciella Kaminsky discloses ninety-six currency crises
occurring between January 1970 and February 2002 (pre sub-prime
mortgage crisis of 2007-08)1' in Argentina,139 Bolivia,140 Brazil,141
Chile, 142 Colombia, 143 Denmark, 14 4 Finland, 14 5 Indonesia,14 6 Israel, 14 7
Malaysia,1 4 8 Mexico,1 49 Norway, 5 o Peru,"5 ' Spain, 5 2 Sweden,I53 the

CAL. BERKELEY, TALKING PEACE: A POPULATION-BASED SURVEY ON ATTITUDES ABOUT
SECURITY, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN LIBERIA

(2011).
134. See generally David Quinn et al., Overcoming Barriers to Peace: Mediating
Violent, Ethnic, Intra-State Crises in Africa 1-37 (Sep. 2009) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n.), http://ssm.com/abstract-1450568.
135. See Cojanu & Popescu, supra note 128, at 123, 132; Rice et al., supra note 130,
at 4-12; Matiangai V. S. Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment in TransitionalJustice, 54
VA. J. INT'LL. 223 (2014).
136. See generally Rosa Brooks, Lessonsfor InternationalLawfrom the Arab Spring,

&

28 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 713 (2013); Simon Chesterman, "Leadingfrom Behind": The
Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention After
Libya, 25 ETHICS & INT'L AFFAIRS 279 (2011); Jack A. Goldstone, Bringing Regimes
Back in-Explaining Success and Failure in the Middle East Revolts of 2011 1-25 (Mar.
10, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract-2283655; David Landau,
The Importance of Constitution-Making, 89 DENVER U. L. REV. 1 (2011); Saira
Mohamed, Taking Stock of the Responsibility to Protect, 48 STAN. J. INT'L L. 63 (2012);
Jordan J. Paust, International Law, Dignity, Democracy, and the Arab Spring, 46
CORNELL INT'L L. J. 1 (2013); Neomi Rao, The Choice to Protect: Rethinking
Responsibilityfor HumanitarianIntervention, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 697 (2013);
Dan E. Stigall, Ungoverned Spaces, Transnational Crime, and the Prohibition on
ExtraterritorialEnforcement Jurisdictionin InternationalLaw, 3 NOTRE DAME J. INT'L
COMP. L. 1 (2013); Rachel Elizabeth VanLandingham, The StarsAligned: The Legality,
Legitimacy, and Legacy of 2011's HumanitarianIntervention in Libya, 46 VAL. U. L.
REV. 859 (2012).
137. See Milena Sterio, The Somali PiracyProblem: A Global Puzzle Necessitatinga
Global Solution (Cleve.-Marshall Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 10-189, 2010),
http://ssm.com/abstract-1576708.
138. See Graciela Kaminsky, Varieties of Currency Crises I (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ.
Res., Working Paper No. 10193, 2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract-483124.
139. See id. at 1, 8; see also Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet & Olivier
Hassler, The Impact of the 2001 FinancialCrisis and the Economic Policy Responses on
the Argentine MortgageMarket, 14 J. HOUSING EcoN. 242 (2005).
140. See Kaminsky, supra note 138, at 1, 8.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.; see also Marek Dabrowski, The Episodes of Currency Crisis in Latin
American and Asian Economies, CASE Network Reports No. 39 (2009),
http://ssm.com/abstract-1434353.
147. See Kaminsky, supra note 138 at 1, 8.
148. Id; see also Dabrowski, supra note 146.
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Philippines,15 4 Thailand,"' Turkey,s 6 Uruguay, 5 7 and Venezuela.158

Other examples of countries that had disruptive currency devaluations
include: Greece;1 59 Hlong Kong (1997);160 Korea (1997);161 Russia;1 62
Singapore (1997);163 and Taiwan (1997).164 Nikoloski contends that it is
the currency crisis, as opposed to banking or sovereign debt crises that
most significantly exacerbates the depth and incidence of poverty in the
near term. 165 Other scholars have written about the impact of the Russian
1998 crisis on Latin American countries,1 66 and other examples of
currency restrictions and lost purchasing power.167
Argentina is but one example of what happens to individuals caught
up in economic crisis. 16 Scholars attribute factors such as the uneasy
149. See Kaminsky, supra note 138, at 1, 8; see also Liliana B. Schumacher, Bank
Runs and CurrencyRun in a System Without a Safety Net: Argentina and the 'Tequila'
Shock, 46 J. MONETARY EcoN. 257 (2000).
150. See Kaminsky, supra note 138, at 1, 8.
151. Id.
152. Id
153. Id
154. Id; see also Alicia Garcia Herrero, Jacob Gyntelberg & Andrea Tesei, The Asian
Crisis: What Did Local Stock Markets Expect?, (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working
Papers No. 261, 2009) http:/ssrn.com/abstract-1468133.
155. See Kaminsky, supra note 138, at 1, 8.
156. Id.
157. Id
158. Id
159. See Alexandra Vlachopoulou, Crises in Emerging Market Economies: Lessons
for Greece (Nov. 16, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2423704.
160. See Andrea Ordanini & Laura Zanetti, The Non-Monetary Effects of the FarEast
FinancialCrisis on European Union Economies, 4 EUR. UNION REv. 91 (1999).
161. See Celso Brunetti et al., Markov Switching Garch Models of Currency Crises in
Southeast Asia (Penn Inst. For Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 03-008, 2003),
http://ssm.com/abstract=392460.
162. See Vlachopoulou, supra note 159, at 25-33.
163. See Ordanini & Zanetti, supra note 160.
164. Id.
165. Zlatko Nikoloski, Impact of FinancialCrises on Poverty in Developing World:
An Empirical Approach, 2-5 (Ctr. for Comparative Econ., Working Paper No. 110,
2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract-1701894.
166. Guillermo A. Calvo & Ernesto Talvi, Sudden Stop, Financial Factors and
Economic Collapse in Latin America: Learning from Argentina and Chile (NBER,
Working Paper No. 11153, 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract-669452.
167. Pablo Bustelo, CapitalFlows and FinancialCrises: A ComparativeAnalysis of
East Asia (1997-98) and Argentina (2001-02) (Complutense U. of Madrid Econ.,
Working Paper No. 2004-017, 2004), http://ssm.com/abstract-612784; Wei Li, Dealing
with Capital Flows: Thailand in 2006 (Darden Case No. UVA-BP-051 1),
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1276570.
168. See generally Enrique Alberola, Humberto Lopez & Luis Servin, Tango with the
Gringo: The HardPeg and Real Misalignment in Argentina (World Bank Policy Res.,
Working Paper No. 3322, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract-610367; Werner Baer, Pedro
Elosegui & Andres A. Gallo, The Achievements and FailuresofArgentina'sNeo-Liberal
Economic Policies (U of Ill., Res., Working Paper No. 01-0114,
2001),
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lack of "confidence in Argentina's domestic currency and the banking
sector due to the continuous changes in regulations on interest rates and
foreign exchange markets as well as the forced conversions of bank
deposits in 1985, 1989, and 2001 as triggers of runs against the
[Argentine] peso."l 6 9 During the mid 1970s to 2002, Argentina had eight
currency crises, four banking crises, and two sovereign defaults.170 For

most of the decade following 2001, the Argentine government limited
daily "money withdrawals from the banking system to a maximum of
300 pesos (equal to US$300)." 1 7 1 Professor Hector Maletta reports:
the Argentine President resigned, the interim
government declared it would not continue servicing its debts, and a
widespread economic crisis ensued. The currency collapsed, banks
At the end of 2001 ...

were ordered to freeze deposits, and the nation's output fell . . .. The

crisis also caused a rise in joblessness to 26% in the wake of the
enormous contraction of consumption, investment and output. After
a decade of price stability, inflation returned with a rise of 40.9
percent along 2002, especially during the first half of the year, and a
further 23.5% distributed along 2003-2005 .... Time deposits were
kept frozen for a long time, and those denominated in dollars were

&

http://ssm.com/abstract=-279383; Nicolds Cachanosky & Adrian 0. Ravier, A Proposalof
Monetary Reform for Argentina: Flexible Dollarization and Free Banking, 19 INDEP.
REv. 396 (2015); Gerard Caprio, Michael P. Dooley, Danny Leipziger & Carl E. Walsh,
The Lender of Last Resort Function Under a Currency Board: The Case of Argentina
(World
Bank
Policy
Res.,
Working
Paper
No.
1648,
1996),
http://ssrn.com/abstract-620520; Augusto De la Torre, Eduardo Levy Levy-Yeyati
Sergio L. Schmukler, Living and Dying with Hard Pegs: The Rise and Fall of
Argentina's Currency Board (World Bank Policy Res., Working Paper No. 2980, 2003),
http://ssrn.com/abstract-352380; Anna Gelpem, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn
from Each Other, 6 CI. J. INT'L L. 391 (2005); Guillermo E. Perry & Luis Servdn, The
Anatomy of a Multiple Crisis: Why was Argentina Special and What Can We Learn
From It? (World Bank Policy Res., Working Paper No. 3081, 2003),
http://ssm.com/abstract=636443; Brad Setser & Anna Gelpern, Argentina's Pathway
Through Financial Crisis (Rutgers Sch. of L.-Newark Res. Papers No. 016; GEG
Working Paper No. 2004/02), http://ssm.com/abstract-884225; Horacio Spector, Don't
Cryfor Me Argentina: Economic Crises and the RestructuringofFinancialProperty, 14
FORDHAM J. BANKING & FIN. L. (2009).

169. See Graciela Kaminsky, Amine Mati & Nada Choueiri, Thirty Years of Currency
Crises in Argentina: External Shocks or Domestic Fragility? (NBER, Working Paper
No. 15478, 8, 2009), http://ssm.com/abstract-1501503 (citing Miguel Kiguel & Pablo
Andres Neumeyer, Seigniorage and Inflation: The Case of Argentina, 27 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 672 (1995)); Neal Ericsson & Steven Kamin, Dollarization in
Argentina (Int'l Fin. Discussion Paper No. 460, Bd. of Govs. of the Fed. Reserve, 1993).
170. See Kaminsky et al., supra note 169, at 1.
171. Daniel Kostzer, Argentina: A Case Study on the Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar
Desocupados, or the Employment Road to Economic Recovery 2 (Levy Econ. Institute,
Working Paper No. 534, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract-l 132772.

838

[Vol. 121:3

PENN STATE LAw REVIEw

forcibly converted to pesos at a loss (in dollars) of about one half of
their previous worth.172

Argentine citizens who had been assured by the government "that a
peso was as good as a dollar, suddenly realized this was not the case.
Not only a peso was not a dollar ... people did not want to hold the
Argentine Currency. Yet because deposits were frozen, they were unable
to dispose of unwanted pesos."l73 Thus, in December 2001, "[a]ngry
Argentines remembered how high inflation during similar freezes in
1982 ... and 1989 had robbed them of the real value of their savings."1 7 4
This 2001 currency crisis and $80 billion default (largest ever
government default at the time) resulted in Argentina being frozen out of
international debt markets for the next fifteen years.175
F.

InternationalReaction is Immediate

Global reaction to the Panama Papers has been swift and too
abundant to cover in great detail. However, already visible reports
include: "French prosecutors disclosed they had searched the offices of
Societe Generale . .. in an attempt to identify holders of offshore

companies set up ...
through ...
Mossack Fonseca;"176 "Peruvian
authorities seized documents from the Lima office of Mossack
Fonseca;"l77 and "El Salvador's top prosecutor oversaw a raid on the
Mossack Fonseca & Co. offices in that country .

...

Computers were

seized and employees interviewed."178 Other reports state that "[i]n
Venezuela journalists who investigated the Panama Papers have also
been targeted by state-owned media, which accused them of selectively
reporting on revelations connected to the administration of the late
President Hugo Chavez." 1 79

172. Hector E. Maletta, A Catastrophe Foretold: Economic Reform, Crisis, Recovery
and Employment in Argentina, 1 (Sept. 2007) (unpublished manuscript)
http://ssm.com/abstract-903124.
173. Sebastian Edwards, The Great Exchange Rate Debate after Argentina (NBER,

Working Paper No. 9257, 2002), http://ssrn.com/abstract-336373.
174. Steve H. Hanke & Kurt Schuler, What Went Wrong in Argentina?, 12 CENTRAL
BANKING 43, 45 (2002).

175.
Cl.

See Julie Wernau, A Record Sale for Argentina, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2016, at

176. See Martha M. Hamilton & Emilia Diaz-Struck, PanamaPolice Raid Mossack
Fonseca As Global Fallout Continues, THE INT'L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE

JOURNALISTS (Apr.
mossack-fonseca.html.

177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id.
Id.

13, 2016), https://panamapapers.icij.org/20160413-panama-raids-

FOLLOWING THE MONEY: LESSONS FROM THE PANAMA PAPERS

2017]

839

&

In the United States, Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for
the Southern District of New York, opened a criminal investigation into
matters flowing from the Panama Papers. 180 Forbes reports that the
181
U.S. Senators
initial reports involve 200 citizens of the United States.
Sherrod Brown and Elizabeth Warren wrote to seek assurances from
then-Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew "that Treasury is investigating 'any
potential involvement of U.S. or U.S.-linked banks, financial service
institutions, or other companies or individuals with Mossack Fonseca
82

Co."'1

British newspaper The Guardian reports that "[t]ax investigators
from 28 countries [gathered] in Paris on [April 16, 2016] to launch an
unprecedented international inquiry following publication of the Panama
Papers." 83 On the same day in Paris, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) participated "in a 'special project meeting' of JITSIC, the Joint
1 84
International Tax Shelter Information and Collaboration network."
The OECD stated that the JITSIC meeting "brought together senior tax
officials from more than 40 countries. They discussed opportunities for
obtaining data, co-operation and information-sharing in light of the
'Panama Papers' revelations."' U.S. Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch
observed:
Before the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention was signed in 1997,
there was no effective multinational framework for the prevention
and prosecution of bribery. Graft was often regarded as simply the
cost of doing business across borders-so much so that some OECD
180. See Martha M. Hamilton, U.S. Prosecutor Opens Investigation Into 'Panama
Papers Matters,' THE INT'L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Apr. 21,
2016), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2016/04/21/19584/us-prosecutor-opens-investigati
on-panama-papers-matters.
181. See Charles Rettig, US Launches Criminal Inquiry Into 200 US Citizens Named
in the Panama Papers, FORBES (Apr. 23, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/irswatch/
2016/04/23/us-launches-criminal-inquiry-into-200-us-citizens-named-in-the-panamapapers/# 11aff7dclebc.
182. See Martha M. Hamilton, 'We're Not Going to Stop,' Mossack Fonseca Tell
Reporters, THE INT'L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Apr. 8, 2016),

https://panamapapers.icij.org/blog/20160408-mossack-fonseca-interviews.html.
183. See Holly Watt, PanamaPapers:Global Tax Officials to Launch Unprecedented
Inquiry, GUARDIAN. Apr. 12, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/12
/panama-papers-global-tax-officials-inquiry-paris-meeting.
184. See Josh Meyer, IRS Urges Americans: Come Clean Now, Before We Read
Panama Papers, NBC NEWS (Apr. 17, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline
/panama-papers/irs-urges-americans-come-clean-now-we-read-panama-papers-n557246.
See also Leandra Lederman, The Use of Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives in the Battle
Against Offshore Tax Evasion, 57 VILL. L. REV. 499 (2012) (discussing IRS "voluntary
disclosure" initiatives).
185. See Meyer, supra note 184.
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nations permitted companies to characterize bribery as a corporate
expense for tax purposes, out of a fear that otherwise, their industries
wouldn't be able to compete for overseas contracts. This, of course,
was the heart of the problem. Acquiescence is the very opposite of
good government-hoping for right to come from what is profoundly
wrong-inserts a cancer into the ethical life of a society. The results
were predictable, the consequences significant.
Today, thanks in part to the tireless efforts of the OECD's Working
Group on Bribery, the picture looks very different. When the
convention took force in 1999, the United States was the only country
with laws on the books that made it a crime to bribe foreign public
officials. Today, there are 41 parties to the Anti-Bribery Convention
and, as required, each of them has passed laws that both criminalize
the bribery of foreign officials and ban tax deductions for such
bribes .. . many countries that aren't party to the convention have
adopted anti-bribery laws and even more are in the process of doing
so-proving that high expectations encourage all to extend their
reach beyond their grasp and seek a better way.1
III. MAY 9,2016 ICIJ DISCLOSURES
I think for anyone who's involved in these kinds of activities, the
message I'd send is [that] transparency is not going to move
backwards. The world is going to become only more and more
transparent as we move forward. And so I would just say that be
very careful and also understand that, for example, leaders in
developing countries all over the world are telling us that they want
to work with us at the World Bank Group very, very strongly to track
down these illicit financial flows to make sure that the fair share of
taxes are being paid so that many, much of these assets that are taken,
you know, out literally of the hands of governments and the poor can
be then reutilized for tackling poverty and inequality.
Jim Yong Kim
World Bank Group President'8 7

186. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch
Delivers Remarks at the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
Anti-Bribery
Ministerial
Meeting,
Paris
(Mar.
16,
2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attomey-general-loretta-e-lynch-delivers-remarksorganization-economic-co-operation-and.
187. See Transcript of World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim's Opening Press
Conference, 2016 WBG/IMF Spring Meetings, Washington, DC (Apr. 14, 2016),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2016/04/14/transcript-world-bank-grouppresident-jim-yong-kim-opening-press-conference.
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On May 9, 2016, the ICIJ released what is likely "the largest-ever
release of information about of offshore companies and the people
behind them, based on data from the Panama Papers Investigation."
The ICIJ reports that users may "search through the data and visualize
the networks around thousands of offshore entities . . . . ICIJ won't

release personal data en masse; the database will not include records of
bank accounts and financial transactions, emails and other
correspondence, passports and telephone numbers."189 - However, ICIJ
member and data unit leader Mar Cabra says that the early May 2016
release includes "all the names connected to more than 200,000 offshore
companies- so we're talking about the beneficiaries, the directories, the
shareholders, the intermediaries, and the addresses connected to those
entities in 21 jurisdictions."19 0
Disclosures from the May 9, 2016 data releases include details that
may result in tax-related indictments and prosecutions during months to
come. While details of these disclosures are too numerous to mention in
this installment, one or two may provide insight into the type of
information provided. For example, the Huffington Post reports that
"Leonard Gotshalk, a former offensive tackle for the Atlanta Falcons,
reportedly paid Mossack Fonseca to set up a company in the British
Virgin Islands three days after being indicted for a scheme to inflate
Following the May 9 disclosures, The
technology . stocks." 191
that Mossack Fonseca-created companies
reports
Washington Post
include those "tied to at least 36 Americans accused of fraud or other
serious financial misconduct." 192 Among these, The Washington Post
states, is Martin Frankel, "a Connecticut financier who pleaded guilty in
2002 to 20 counts of wire fraud... . counts of securities fraud and
racketeering. conspiracy, and Andrew Wiederhom, an Oregon corporate

188. See Marina Walker Guevara, Coming Soon: ICI to Release Panama Papers
Offshore CompaniesData, THE INT'L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Apr.

26,2016), https://panamapapers.icij.org/20160426-database-coming-soon.html.
189. Id.
190. See Mar Cabra & Erin Kissane, Wrangling 2.6TB of Data: The People and the
Technology Behind the Panama Papers, THE INT'L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE
JOURNALISTS (Apr. 25, 2016), https://panainapapers.icij.org/blog/20160425-data-tech-

team-ICIJ.html.
191. See Michelle Smith, PanamaPapersLeak: Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and
Others on the List, HUFFINGTON POST (May 10, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com

/gobankingrates/panama-papers-leak-donald_b_9897812.html.
192. See Michael Hudson et al., PanamaPapersInclude Dozens ofAmericans Tied to
FinancialFrauds, WASH. POST., May 9, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/investi

gations/panama-papers-include-dozens-of-americans-tied-to-financialfrauds/2016/05/09/dl99bfa2-12d3-11e6-81b4-58la5c4c42df story.html.
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executive who pleaded guilty to two felonies in a case tied to one of the
largest corporate scandals in Oregon history."' 93
IV. ETHICS OF GOVERNANCE: GLOBAL IMPACT ON ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND REGIME STABILITY

The Panama Papers investigation unmasks the dark side of the global
financial system where banks, lawyers and financial professionals
enable secret companies to hide illicit corrupt money. This must
stop. World leaders must come together and ban the secret
companies that fuel grand corruption and allow the corrupt to benefit
from ill-gotten wealth.
Josd Ugaz
Chair, TransparencyInternational94
The World Bank states that "[t]oday corruption arguably has
become the most challenging obstacle to economic development." Many
scholars have focused their attention to the issues of global bribery,
corruption, and the resultant impact on victimized populations. 195
A.

Bribery, Corruptionand Extortion Defined

Bribery, corruption, and extortion are closely related concepts.
Black's Law Dictionary defines bribery as "[t]he corrupt payment,
receipt, or solicitation of a private favor for official action;"1 9 6
commercial bribery as "(1) [t]he knowing solicitation or acceptance of a
benefit in exchange for violating an oath of fidelity, such as that owed by
an employee, partner, trustee, or attorney; [(2) omitted]; (3) [c]orrupt
dealing with the agents or employees of prospective buyers to secure an
advantage over business competitors."197 The World Bank defines
bureaucratic or administrative corruption as the "intentional imposition
of distortions in the prescribed implementation of existing laws, rules,
and regulations to provide advantages to individuals in and/or outside
government through illicit, nontransparent means.
Bribes to tax
193. Id.
194. Press Release, The Int'l Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Transparency
International Calls for Immediate Action by World Leaders to Stop Secret Companies,
(Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/transparency

internatio

nal calls forimmediateaction byworld leaders tos.
195. See THE MANY FACES OF CORRUPTION: TRACKING VULNERABILITIES AT THE
SECTOR LEVEL, WORLD BANK 2 (J. Edgardo Campos & Sanjay Pradhan eds., 2007),

https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6848/39985OREPLACEM
101OFFICIALOUSEOONLY1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
196.

Bribery, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 80 (3rd Pocket ed. 2006).

197.

Id. at 81.
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collectors to 'reduce' one's tax liabilities are a classic example."1 98 The
World Bank also counsels that the terms patronage and nepotism "refer
to favoritism shown to narrowly targeted interests by those in power in
return for political support. The granting of personal favors, awarding
'sole-source' contracts, or making (unmerited) appointments to public
office are examples." 199 In addition, the term state capture refers to the
"actions of individuals, groups, or firms both in the public and private
sectors to influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees, and other

government policies to their own advantage." 2 00 Extortion is defined as
"(1) the offense committed by a public official who illegally obtains
property under the color of office; esp., an official's collection of an
unlawful fee; (2) [t]he act or practice of obtaining something or
compelling some action by illegal means, as by force or coercion." 20 1
B.

Cost ofBribery and Corruption

Shortly after the Panama Papers story broke, University of
California, Berkeley, Professor Gabriel Zucman told National Public
Radio that the total of wealth hidden from public view or accountability
vastly exceeds those associated with the Panamanian Mossack Fonseca
law firm. "'You know, it's just one firm in one tax haven, and there is
much more going on,' Mr. Zucman said, calculating that about eight
percent of the world's financial wealth is held in tax havens. 'So that's
about $7.6 trillion today, a huge amount of wealth."' 202 William J.
Magnuson observes that "[p]olitical corruption can be deeply harmful to
society, as it distorts government decision-making, 203 delegitimizes

198. See Campos & Pradhan, supra note 195, at 3 (internal citations omitted).
199. Id
200. Id. (internal citations omitted).
201. Extortion, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
202. See Steven Erlanger et al., Iceland's Prime Minister Steps Down Amid Panama
Papers Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/world
/europe/panama-papersiceland.html?action=click&contentCollection=World&Module=RelatedCoverage&regio
n+Ma. See also GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF NATIONS: THE SCOURGE OF

TAX HAVENS (U Chi. Press, 2015).
203. See William J. Magnuson, International Corporate Bribery and Unilateral
Enforcement, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 360, 364 n.9 (2013) (citing LAWRENCE
LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: How MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS-AND A PLAN TO STOP It

226-47 (2011)) (how corruption affects legislative decision-making); Paulo Mauro,
Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure, 69 J. PUB. EcoN. 263
(1988) (corruption reduces government spending on education and otherwise alters the
composition of government expenditure). But see FRANK ANECHIARICO & JAMES B.
JACOBS, THE PURSUIT OF ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY:

How CORRUPTION CONTROL MAKES

GOVERNMENT INEFFECTIVE 174-85 (1996) (suggesting that the public may not benefit
from prosecutions of government corruption).
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political institutions,204 reduces administrative efficiency 205 and slows
economic growth." 2 06 The Economist observes that "corruption makes
the world poorer and less equal. When politicians steal, they reduce the
amount of public cash left over for roads or schools. When they give
sweetheart contracts to their chums, they defraud taxpayers and deter
honest firms from investing in their country. All this hobbles growth." 20 7
Scholars "claim that corruption reduces economic growth, via reduced
private investment ... [others] find that corruption limits development
(per capita income, child mortality, and literacy)... [while yet others]
argue that corruption affects the making of economic policy." 2 08

.

The Wall Street Journal reports that "[r]evenue lost to tax havens is
a sore point for the G-20, not only politically as it fuels voter anger, but
also because many governments have limited room in their budgets to
jump-start weak output. . . The OECD estimates such practices cost
governments between $100 billion and $240 billion in lost revenue each
year." 2 09 Elsewhere, the author and Kara Altenbaumer-Price have
observed "that the global and domestic culture of bribery, extortion, and
corruption is an amorphous cancer eating away at our societies with the
very real potential to destroy commerce between nations and produce
destructive global civil unrest." 21 0 Alexandra Wrage, President of
Annapolis, Maryland-based TRACE International, states that, when it
comes to bribery, international competitors must play by the same rules
to "minimize the 'prisoners' dilemma" because "bribery is wrong . .
uneconomical, inefficient, costly, distorting of proper incentives and
outcomes, risky, and generally unprofitable. It is, in short, a poor way to

204. See Magnuson, supra note 203, at 364 n.10 (citing Joseph S. Nye, Corruption
and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 417, 422
(1967)) (corruption can. lead to instability and national disintegration by destroying the
legitimacy of political structures in the eyes of those who may have power to correct the
situation); Susan Rose-Ackerman, The PoliticalEconomy of Corruption, in CORRuPTION
AND THE GLOBAL EcoNoMY 31, 45 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997).
205. See Magnuson, supra note 203, at 364 n.11 (citing Gerald E. Caiden & Naomi J.
Caiden, Administrative Corruption, 37 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 301 (1977)) (effects of
corruption upon administrative efficiency).
206. See Magnuson, supra note 203, at 364 n.12 (citing Paolo Mauro, Corruptionand
Growth, 110 Q. J. ECON. 681 (1995)) (finding that economic growth is reduced when
corruption lowers private investment).
207. See Leak of the Century, supra note 37.
208. See Daniel Lederman et al., Accountability and Corruption: Political
Institutions Matter, 17 ECON. & POL. 1, 1 (2001), http://web.worldbank.org/archive/
website00894A/WEB/PDF/ACCO UN-2.PDF.
209. See Ian Talley, G-20 Puts Tax Havens on Notice, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2016, at
A12.
210. See Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, Lawyers, Guns and
Money-The Bribery Problem and U.K. BriberyAct, 47 INT'L LAw 481, 483 (2013).
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do business."211
Writing during 2008, professor Martine Boersma
describes how in Nigeria "between 1960 and 1999, approximately US

$380 billion was lost due to corruption." 2 12 During the rule of Nigerian
military dictator Sani Abacha (between 1993 and 1998), embezzlement
estimates for Abacha and his inner circle "run up to US $5 billion.
Meanwhile, between 50 and 90 million Nigerians live on less than a
dollar per day and the per capita income stands at merely a third of the
level of 1980 ... the country has . .. an average life-expectancy of a
mere 43.7 years."2 13
U.S. Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch observes that "[o]ur
collective failure to take a stand against bribery sowed mistrust and
resentment among nations. It distorted markets and diminished
prosperity. And, above all, it harmed ordinary people by increasing their
cost of living, depriving them, of crucial public services and eroding their
faith in government institutions."2 14 Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, a United
Nations independent expert on human rights and foreign debt, says "[t]ax
evasion destroys trust in public institutions and the rule of law, and
shrinks the fiscal space for investing in public healthcare, education,
social security and other goods and services."2 15 On another occasion
Attorney General Lynch stated,

211.

ALEXANDRA

ADDISON

WRAGE,

BRIBERY

AND

EXTORTION:

UNDERMINING

BUSINESS, GOVERNMENTS, AND SECURITY 124 (Praeger Security International 2007). An

analysis of prominent bribery cases, involving 107 publicly listed firms from 20 stock
markets that have committed bribery of government officials in 52 countries worldwide

during 1971-2007, concludes that their results "have numerous policy implications.
Measures that promote shareholder monitoring of managers (director liability,
shareholder lawsuits) may help reduce bribery. Institutions that promote transparency
(democracy, freedom of the press, education, disclosure of politician sources of income),
institutions that promote enforcement (police reliability), and measures that eliminate

regulatory rigidities may also help reduce bribery."

Stephen Yan-Leung Cheung,

Raghavendra Rau & Aris Stouraitis, How Much Do Firms Pay as Bribes and What
Benefits Do They Get? Evidencefrom Corruption Cases Worldwide (24th Australasian

Finance and Banking Conference 2011 Paper, 2012), http://ssm.com/abstract-1772246.
212. Martine Boersma, Catching the 'Big Fish'? A Critical Analysis of the Current
International and Regional Anti-Corruption Treaties 3 (Nov. 14, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301602.

213.

Id See also Franklin Allen et al., Corruption and Competition 1 (Oct. 30, 2015)

(unpublished manuscript) (finding that the damaging impact of corruption on economic

growth seems to differ substantially across countries, where with "large and regionally
diverse countries such as China and India, rampant corruption has not slowed down

growth;" although in "many African and South American countries it seems that corrupt
officials severely retard growth"), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2685219
214. See Press Release, supra note 186.
215. See Holly Watt, Panama Papers:
Global Tax Officials to Launch
Unprecedented Inquiry, GUARDIAN (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/news/

2016/apr/12/panama-papers-global-tax-officials-inquiry-paris-meeting.
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[W]hether in a nation or an organization, whether committed by
public officials or private citizens, corruption undermines our values,
diminishes confidence in our institutions and shakes the foundations
of our global society.
Like many of you, I have seen firsthand how these insidious practices
can strike at the core of who we are and who we aspire to be. Before
becoming Attorney General, I prosecuted organized crime and public
corruption cases as a United States Attorney in New York. It is, of
course, the ultimate betrayal of public trust when public officials
place themselves above the law, abandon their responsibilities to
those whom we are all sworn to serve and seek instead to serve their
own interests. I pursued elected leaders and officials accused of
exploiting those they were sworn to serve. I took on international
syndicates determined to subvert the rule of law. And I witnessed
how profoundly their betrayal of public trust can diminish our
communities and imperil our highest ideals. As you know,
corruption frequently paves the way for follow-on offenses ranging
from money laundering to transnational crime-and even
terrorism. It destabilizes nations, causing ripple effects in
neighboring regions and raising security concerns around the
world. And with an estimated $1.6 trillion in ill-gotten proceeds
from criminal activity-including corruption-crossing international
borders every year, it siphons badly-needed resources away from the
vulnerable populations that need them most, placing innumerable
lives in grave danger and wrenching poverty. 216
The scourge of corruption, according to Donnelly and Kellogg,
"stretches from multinational firms in the United States, to manufacturers
in China, to farmers in Latin America. It has led to water scarcity in
Spain, child labor in China, illegal logging in Indonesia, unsafe medicine
in Nigeria, and poorly constructed buildings in Turkey, where collapses
have killed people." 2 17
C.

Implicationsfor Terrorism

During his May 1, 2016 appearance on NBC News' Meet the Press,
CIA Director John Brennan stated that there are "a lot of problems in
many parts of the world that the terrorists have taken advantage of.
Endemic corruption, the lack of good governance, the lack of economic
opportunity, the lack of government over different parts of the country
216. See Loretta E. Lynch, U.S. Attorney General, Remarks at the 20th Annual Int'l
Assoc. of Prosecutors Conf. (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-addresses-20th-annual-intemational-association.
217. Francis X. Donnelly & Sarah Kellogg, Understanding Corruption, GEO. WASH.
Bus., Fall 2011, at 9.
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where terrorists have been able to go and burrow." 2 18 Assistant Attorney
General Leslie R. Caldwell states:
[T]he problems affecting one nation can easily affect us all. With
corruption, financial crime, money laundering and cybercrime,
among others, we are faced with global challenges that require a truly
global response. That is why it is essential that we continue to
examine and leverage new tools to enhance our fight against
transnational crime.
The increase in globalized business has drawn international
corruption into the spotlight. Unfortunately, corruption is present in
all countries. It makes our nation less safe, thwarts economic
development, traps entire populations in poverty and leaves countries
without a credible justice system. Corrupt officials who put their
personal enrichment before the benefit of their citizenry create
unstable countries. And as we have seen time and again, unstable
countries become the breeding grounds and safe havens for terrorist
groups and other criminals who threaten the security of us all. 2 19
D.

Who Bribes?

D'Souza and Kaufmann report that "[b]ribery can occur at several
stages during the procurement process, such as during the feasibility
study, during tendering, or when determining bid eligibility; in assessing
and awarding the bid; or during project implementation and/or in recontracting." 2 20 Of great consequence, this corruption has the potential
to "distort the overall structure of government expenditures if officials
skew the allocation of resources toward sectors where graft is more
lucrative and/or less prone to detection, e.g., from social services to
defense."22 1
D'Souza and Kaufmann report about data known as the Global
Competitiveness Report and collected from a 2006 survey of 11,232

218. John Brennan, Dir., U.S.CIA, Interview on Meet the Press, NBC NEWS (May 1,
2016),
http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/meet-the-press-24-7/meet-press-may- 1-2016n565516.
219. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Assistant Attorney General Leslie R.
Caldwell Speaks at Catholic University of Colombia on Strategic International
Cooperation in Fight Against Transnational Crime, Bogata Colombia (Apr. 12, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-speakscatholic-university-colombia.
220. Anna E. D'Souza & Daniel Kaufmann, Who Bribes in Public Contractingand
Why: Worldwide Evidencefrom Firms, 14 EcoN. Gov. 333, 335 (2013).
221. Id. (citing Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, Q. J. ECON. 599
(Aug. 1993)); Mauro, supra note 203; Vito Tanzi & Hamid R. Davoodi, Corruption,
Growth and Public Finances (IMF Working Paper No. 182, 2000),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=880260.
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business managers located in 125 countries, conducted by the World
Economic Forum.222 The D'Souza and Kaufmann report reveals:
[A] large proportion of global managers admit that 'firms like theirs'
pay illicit payments in order to secure government contracts.223 On
average, approximately 32 %of managers report that firms like theirs
bribe to secure a government contract; this percentage ranges from 13
% of firms based in high-income OECD countries [that report
bribery] ...

[to] 50 percent in low-income countries .

.

..

[Public.

Worldwide procurement
contracting is extremely lucrative.
expenditures were estimated over a decade ago] to be $4.73 trillion
for OECD countries (about 20% of their aggregate GDP) and $816
billion (about 15% of GDP) for non-OECD countries.224 [In
addition,] "in public procurement projects; estimates by the OECD
suggest that bribes can represent between 5 and 25 % of the total
contract value in international business transactions. 225
E.

Ranking of Country Business EnvironmentDifficulty

The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2015
(CPI) presents an indication of domestic, public sector corruption, and
reveals that two-thirds of the 168 countries covered score below fifty
(50), on a scale from 0 (zero), perceived to be highly corrupt-to 100
(one-hundred), perceived to be very clean. 22 6 In discussing the 2015
Corruption Perceptions Index, Jos6 Ugaz, Chair at Transparency
International, observes that the "index clearly shows that corruption
remains a blight around the world. But 2015 was also a year when
people again took to the streets to protest corruption. People across the
globe sent a strong signal to those in power: it is time to tackle grand
,,227
corruption.
According to TI's Corruption Perceptions Index 2015, countries
comprising the most difficult business environments for corruption are as
follows: of the 168 countries listed for 2015, Denmark, Finland,
Sweden, and New Zealand, and Singapore, (in that order) are considered
to be "very clean." 22 8 Countries having major economic commerce or
otherwise being particularly significant to the U.S. (ranked 16h) are the
following: Canada (ranked 9 th); the United Kingdom (ranked 10b);
222. See D'Souza & Kaufmann, supra note 220, at 336.
223. Id. at 334.
224. Id.
225. Id (internal citations omitted).
226. Corruption
Perceptions
Index
2015,
TRANSPERANCY
http://www.transparency.org/cpi20l5 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
227. Id.
228. See id.

INT'L,
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Brazil ( 7 6 th); China ( 8 3 rd); Mexico ( 9 5th); Argentina ( 10 7 th); Nigeria
( 13 6 th); Pakistan (11 7 th); Kenya (1 3 9th); Russia (11 9 th)-and
perceived to
be most corrupt-Iraq (161st); Libya (161st); Angola ( 16 3rd); South
Sudan ( 1 6 3rd); Sudan (165t); Afghanistan (1 6 6 th); North Korea ( 16 7th);

.

and Somalia (167th). 22 9 Representing the views of more than 114,000
people in 107 countries and territories, TI's Global Corruption
Barometer 2013 (most recent data available), discloses that "one in four
people (27 percent) report having paid a bribe in the last 12 months . .
."230 Furthermore, "reported bribes to the police have almost doubled
since the 2006 Barometer, and more people report paying bribes to the
judiciary and for registry and permit services than five years ago. Trust
in governments and politicians is also low." 2 3 1
F.

Growing Intolerancefor Bribery and Corruption

During recent years, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
enforcement activities have been brought by the DOJ and SEC in the
United States.232 Measures in other jurisdictions include the U.K.
Bribery Act of 20 10.233 Perhaps technological advances such as the
widespread availability of smart phones and increased access to the
Internet has fostered a sense of empowerment among populations that
previously felt powerless to fight corruption and political oppression.
Certainly, the increased ability to communicate displeasure about
corruption has increased with greater widespread availability of
individual technological devices.234
G.

Arab Spring
While many causes are responsible for the Arab Spring, "[o]ne of

these sources was social media and its power to put a human face on
political oppression."23 5 When a young vegetable merchant in Tunesia,
Mohammed Bouazizi, "set himself on fire in protest of the government
229.

See id.

230.

Global Corruption Barometer 2013,

TRANSPERANCY

INT'L

3

(2013)

http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/global corruption barometer 2013.
231. CorruptionPerceptionsIndex 2015, supra note 226, at 83.
232. See 2015 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DuNN (Jan. 4, 2016),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/2015-Year-End-FCPA-Update.pdf,
Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, Foreign CorruptPractices Act: An
Update on Enforcement and SEC and DOJ Guidance, 41 SEC. REG. L.J. 241, 249-50
(2013).
233. See Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 210, at 498.
234. See infra Part VI.
235. Philip N. Howard et al., Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social
Media During the Arab Spring?, 1, 2 (Project on Information Tech. & Political Islam,
Working Paper No. 2011.1, 2011), http://ssm.com/abstract-2595096.
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on December 17, 2010, democratic fervor spread across North Africa and
the Middle East. Governments in Tunesia and Egypt soon fell, civil war
broke out in Libya, and protesters took to the streets in Algeria,
Morocco, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere."2 36
Richard Alderman, Director of the U.K.'s Serious Fraud Office
(SFO) until April 2012, observes:
I have been following . . the events of the Arab Spring with the very
greatest of interest. I have also been looking at what has been
happening recently in India, China, Russia, and other
countries. When I look, in particular, at the Arab Spring I see that
corruption is one of the top issues raised by the citizens of these
countries as one of their main grievances against the government or,
indeed in some cases, the former government. Some say that bribery
is part of the culture of those countries and that we must respect
it. The citizens of those countries have demonstrated very clearly to
my mind that this is not part of the culture that they are prepared to
accept any longer. 237
Transparency International has observed, "[r]ecent events in the
Middle East have brought into stark relief the desperation people felt
about levels of corruption in their countries."23 8 When reflecting upon
the Arab Spring, Transparency International observed that "events in the
Middle East have brought into stark relief the desperation people felt
about levels of corruption in their countries." 2 39 "Egypt, Lebanon,
Morocco and Palestine all suffer from unchecked executive power and
lack access to information laws and whistleblower protection legislation,
greatly hindering citizens' ability to report and stop corrupt practices,"
Transparency International reports.240 Soon after these observations,
events produced regime change in Libya (1969 and 201 1),241 and Egypt
(2013).242
Professors Timothy Fort and Cindy Schipani report "a nearly
perfect correlation between corruption and violence in countries around
236.

Id.

237. Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 210, at 483 (citing Richard
Alderman, Dir., Serious Fraud Office, U.K., Address at the Risk Advisory's DC Dinner
(Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.riskadvisory.net/analysis/story/serious-fraud-office-directoraldermanspeaks-at-risk-advisorys-dc-dinner)).
(2000),
84
1,
INT'L
TRANSPARENCY
2010,
Report
238. Annual
https://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/annual-report2010?mode=window&pri
ntButtonEnabled=false&shareButtonEnabled=false&searchButtonEnabled=false&backgr
oundColor--%23222222.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See Mehrdad Payandeh, The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime
Change in Libya, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 355, 372 (2012).
242. See McDonnell, supra note 124, at 365.

2017]

FOLLOWING THE MONEY: LESSONS FROM THE PANAMA PAPERS

851

the world. The more corrupt a regime, the more likely it was to resolve
disputes through violence." 2 43 Moreover, "the violence doesn't just flow
from rulers," said Fort. "Sometimes the populace is so frustrated by
corrupt leaders that their resentment finally explodes in a physical act.
The uprising that has spread across Arab countries began [during 2010]
with resistance against the corrupt leadership of Tunisia." 24 4
H.

Foreign CorruptPracticesAct (FCPA)

Much has been written during recent years about the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA); however, I will present only a brief
description here.245 In conjunction with comments prompted by the
global reaction to the Panama Papers, President Obama observed that:
243. Timothy L. Fort, CorruptionSpawns Violence, GW Bus, Fall 2011, at 11. See
also Cindy A. Schipani & Timothy L. Fort, Adapting Corporate Governance for
Sustainable Peace, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 377 (2003); see also Cindy A. Schipani
& Timothy L. Fort, The Role of the Corporation in Fostering Sustainable Peace, 35
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389 (2002); Cindy A. Schipani & Timothy L. Fort, Ecology and
Violence: The EnvironmentalDimensions of War (William Davidson Institute, Working
Paper No. 698, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=555824.
244. Fort, supra note 243, at 11.
245. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1-78m); see generally Padideh Ala'i, Civil
Consequences of Corruptionin InternationalCommercial Contracts, 62 AM. J. COMP. L.
185 (2014); Norman Bishara & David Hess, Human Rights and a Corporation'sDuty to
Combat Corruption 2 (Univ. Mich. Sch., Bus., Working Paper No. 1226, 2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2388395; Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, Foreign Affairs
and Enforcement of the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 409
(2014); Juscelino F. Colares, The Evolving Domestic and International Law Against
Foreign Corruption: Some New and Old Dilemmas Facing the InternationalLawyer, 5
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 1 (2006); Evan Epstein, Combate Contra la Corrupci6n
Internacional y Enfoque en Amdrica Latina: Ley FCPA y Nuevo Programa del
Departamentode Justiciade los Estados Unidos [InternationalAnti-Corruption Efforts
and Focus on Latin America: FCPA and the New DOJ Voluntary Disclosure Pilot
Program] 1 (Rock Ctr. Corp. Governance Stan. Univ., Working Paper No. 218, 2016),
http://ssm.com/abstract-2774491; David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption
and Reform Undertakings: A New Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT'L L. J.
307 (2008); Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Value of Foreign
Bribery to Bribe Paying Firms 2 (June 16, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssm.com/abstract-1573222; Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing
Bribery and Extortion in InternationalBusiness Transactions, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 303
(2012); Mike Koehler, Foreign CorruptPractices Act Statistics, Theories, Policies, and
Beyond, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 157 (2016); Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen A.
Lacey, Investigation of Halliburton Co./TSKJ's Nigerian Business Practices: Model for
Analysis of the Current Anti-CorruptionEnvironment on Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct
Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503 (2006); William Nelson, No Good Deed
Goes Unpunished: Charitable Contributionsand the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 11
DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 331 (2013); Peter Reilly, Negotiating Bribery: Toward
Increased Transparency, Consistency, and Fairness in PretrialBargaining Under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 10 HASTINGS Bus. L. J. 347 (2014); D. Daniel Sokol,
Policing the Firm, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 785 (2013); Elizabeth K. Spahn,
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The United States was the first country to criminalize money
laundering and the U.S.'s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
provided the model for the OECD's Anti-Bribery Convention and
other efforts globally. The Department of Justice has an unparalleled
commitment to, and record of, fighting corruption through law
enforcement action, as reflected through six anti-corruption
programs:
*

public integrity prosecutions of U.S. public officials;

*

prosecutions of U.S. individuals that pay bribes to foreign
officials;

*

prosecutions of U.S. taxpayers who seek to conceal foreign
accounts, as well as bankers and advisors;

*

pursuit of those who misuse the U.S. financial system
through money laundering and other corrupt schemes;

*

the pioneering Kleptocracy Initiative, which uses
investigation and litigation to recover the proceeds of
foreign official corruption and return the proceeds to the
citizens of countries victimized by corruption, which has led
to the restraint of more than $1.8 billion involving 12
countries; and,

*

assistance to foreign counterparts in fighting corruption,
both through cooperation in foreign corruption cases and
through overseas capacity building.

The FCPA deals with two primary activities, bribery and improper
record keeping, and prohibits: (1) the "payments of anything of value to
foreign officials 'in order to assist [the payor] in obtaining or retaining
MultiurisdictionalBribery Law Enforcement: The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 53
VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2012); Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding
Anti-Bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L.
REv. 351 (2010); Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big
to Debar?, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 775 (2011); Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective
Ethics & Compliance Programs, 39 J. CORP. L. 769, 773-74 (2014); Jessica Tillipman,
The Congressional War on Contractors, 45 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 235, 239-42
(2013); Trautman & -Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 28; David M. Uhlmann, Deferred
Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 72 MD. L. REv. 1295, 1326 (2013); Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic
Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct, 45 GA. L. REv. 489 (2011); Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and
the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 781 (2011).
246. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: Obama
Admin. Announces Steps to Strengthen Fin. Transparency, and Combat Money
Laundering, Corruption, and Tax Evasion (May 5, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov
/the-press-office/2016/05/05/fact-sheet-obama-administration-announces-stepsstrengthen-financial.
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business for or with, or directing business to, any person;"' 24 7 and (2)
"failing to keep records and books 'which, in reasonable detail,
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets
of the issuer."' 24 8 "'When the FCPA is read as a whole, its core of
criminality is seen to be bribery of a foreign2 49official to induce him to
perform an official duty in a corrupt manner."'
Virtually every company is subject to the statute's prohibitions,
whether public or private, as well as every person that touches the United
States. 'Four categories of actors are involved: (1) "'issuers' 25 0 (public
companies);" (2) "any business with its principal place of business in the
United States or that is organized under the laws of any state, territory,
possession, or commonwealth of the United States (private
companies);" 25 1 (3) "United States citizens, nationals, and residents;" and
(4) "'other persons who take any act in furtherance of the corrupt
payment while within the territory of the United States.,,, 25 2 .. Issuers'
are 'companies whose securities are registered in the United States or
that are required to file periodic reports with the SEC."' 25 3 Actions by
both issuers and domestic concerns are subject to the FCPA's antibribery provisions anywhere in the world. 25 4
U.S. Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch reports that "[s]ince 2009,
the U.S. Department of Justice has brought more than 60 criminal cases
against individuals and more than 60 cases against corporations in
connection with foreign bribery charges, resulting in the collection of
more than $4 billion in penalties." 255 In addition, "our colleagues at the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC, have brought actions
against more than 85 companies and approximately 35 individuals,
247. Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 28, at 149 (citing 15 USC § 78dd1(a)(1)(B) (2012)).
248. Id. (citing 15 USC § 78m (b)(2)(A) (2012)).
249. Id. (citing United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 761 (5th Cir. 2004)).
250. Id. Issuers include both U.S. public companies, as well as foreign companies
whose shares trade on U.S. exchanges. As "an example, the department recently
prosecuted Siemens AG, a major German multinational firm. It is a German company,
but its shares trade on the New York Stock Exchange, which makes it a foreign issuer
and therefore subject to the FCPA." Frontline: Black Money (PBS television broadcast,
Apr. 7, 2009), Interview with Mark F. Mendelsohn, former Deputy Chief, Fraud Section,
Criminal Div., U. S. Dep't of Justice, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
blackmoney/interviews/mendelsohn.html.
251. Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 28, at 149 (noting that such
companies are referred to as "domestic concerns" under the statute 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)
(2012)).
252. Id at 150 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h) (2012)).
253. Id. (citing Aaron G. Murphy, PractitionerNote: The Migratory Patterns of
Business in the Global Village, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 229, 237, (2005)).
254. Id. (citing Murphy, supra note 253, at 237).
255. Press Release, supra note 186.
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resulting in fines, disgorgement and prejudgment interest of about $2.5
billion," during that same period of time.256
I.

VimpelCom

The DOJ and SEC point to reaching, under the FCPA, a recent
criminal resolution with telecommunications giant VimpelCom (the
world's sixth-largest).2 57 Under the terms of this resolution:
VimpelCom admitted to conspiring to pay more than $114 million in
bribes to a government official in Uzbekistan; it agreed to pay the
United States a penalty of more than $230 million; and it consented
to submit to an independent compliance monitor. In addition to our
criminal proceedings against VimpelCom, we have also filed civil
complaints seeking the forfeiture of more than $850
258million in funds
traceable to the attempt to bribe the Uzbek official.
J.

Growth in Anti-CorruptionTreaties

Professor Martine Boersma reports that, "for many years, the US
was the only country prohibiting bribery of public officials abroad.
Given the idea that this lonely stance harmed US corporations, the 1988
amendments to the FCPA ... called upon the US President to lobby for
internationalisation of the FCPA within the context of the OECD." 2 59 20
years after passage of the FCPA (1997), "pressure by the Clinton
Administration resulted in the adoption of the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions . . . ."260 The adoption of international and regional anticorruption treaties followed during the mid-1990s:
and the majority of those contain provisions on the criminalization of
active foreign bribery. This means that many countries that are a
party to the anti-corruption treaties are now under the obligation as
well to criminalize active foreign bribery by their MNCs and citizens,
although it is by no means certain that the legal provisions on this
issue are actively enforced. 261
While detailed treatment of the recent corruption treaty landscape is
beyond the scope of this paper, important developments include: the
monitoring schematic found in the Report of Buenos Aires (2001) peer
256.

Id.

257.

Id.

258.
259.
260.
261.

Id.
Boersma, supra note 212, at 9.
Id.
Id.
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review MESICIC follow-up procedure; 262 European Union PFI
Convention (1995), FirstProtocol(1996) and Second Protocol(1997);263
the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (1999)
and (2003);264 African Instruments such as the SADC Protocol Against
Corruption (200 1);265 ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight Against
Corruption (2001);266 and African Union Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption(2003);267 and UK Bribery Act (20 10).268
K.

Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative

The DOJ's efforts to return assets stolen by corruption to those
individuals harmed includes the 2010 launch of the Kleptocracy Asset
Recovery Initiative, to date responsible for the recovery of
"approximately $63 million in bribery proceeds and embezzled funds ...
. asset forfeiture actions against VimpelCom ... the 2014 forfeiture of
$480 million embezzled by Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha and his
associates-the largest forfeiture the Department of Justice has ever
secured through a kleptocracy action and which is now on
appeal." 2 69 The DOJ points to other successful efforts with international
partners, where "we recovered and repatriated more than $115 million
for the Kazakh people. We helped our South Korean allies recover
almost $28 million in bribery proceeds; we recouped $22 million for the
people of Peru; and we recovered more than $3 million for the people of
Nicaragua." 2 70
V.

TAx EVASION DEFINED
For fifty years, executive, legislative, and judicial branches around
the globe have utterly failed to address the metastasizing tax havens
spotting Earth's surface . . . . Banks, financial regulators and tax
authorities have failed. Decisions have been made that have spared
the wealthy while focusing instead on reining in middle- and lowincome citizens.
John Doe
Author, "The Revolution Will Be Digitized"

262. Id. at 13-15.
263. Id. at 15-16.
264. Id. at 23-24.
265. Id. at 26-27.
266. Id at 28.

267.

Id. at 28-31.

268.

See generally Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 210.

269.
270.

Press Release, supra note 186.
Id.
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InternationalConsortium ofInvestigativeJournalists271
A.

Tax Definitions

We are indebted to Professor Stuart Green for his following
definitions: tax means "a compulsory, non-punitive exaction of money
from a private person or entity by a public authority for public
purposes."272
The various types of tax include:
"income tax,
consumption tax, corporate tax, capital gains tax, property tax, sales tax,
inheritance tax, value added tax, excise tax, poll tax, tariffs, tolls, and
transfer tax." 2 7 3 The term tax evasion has been defined to mean "the
unlawful and intentional nonpayment or avoidance of tax owed."2 74 U.S.
federal law
distinguishes between the willful nonpayment of taxes or failure to
file a return, both of which are generally treated as a misdemeanor
under I.R.C. § 7203; and tax evasion proper, which carries a penalty
of five years in prison under § 7201, and requires not only the willful
nonpayment of taxes but also some additional concealment of one's
activities.275

The above forms of illegality are distinguishable from tax
mitigation or avoidance, "which consists of using legal means to reduce
the amount of taxes owed ...
276
A detailed discussion about.the ethics of tax.evasion is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, Professor Robert W. McGee has observed
that "[t]he ethics of tax evasion can be examined from a number of
perspectives," including:
a practitioner or legal perspective,
"philosophical approach ... various religious, secular, and philosophical
perspectives . . . from an ethical perspective . . . . Another possibility is
that there is no duty to pay." 27 7 Professor McGee observes that in a few
studies "the focus of the discussion is on government corruption and the

271. John Doe, Panama Papers Source Offers Documents to Governments, Hints At
More To Come, THE INT'L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (May 6, 2016),
https://panamapapers.icij.org/20160506-john-doe-statement.html.

272. See Stuart'P. Green, What is Wrong With Tax Evasion?, 9 Hous. Bus. & TAX
L.J. 220, 221 (2009).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 7203 (2003); Id. § 7201.)
276. Id. (emphasis added).
277. Robert W. McGee, Four Views on the Ethics of Tax Evasion, in THE ETHICS OF
TAX EVASION: PERSPECTIVES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 3, 4 (New York: Springer, 2012).
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reasons why the citizenry does not feel any moral duty to pay taxes to
such a government." 27 8
VI.

TECHNOLOGY MEANS SECRECY IS NOT SECRET ANYMORE
[W]e live in a time of inexpensive, limitless digital storage and fast
internet connections that transcend national boundaries. It doesn't
take much to connect the dots: from start to finish, inception to
global media distribution, the next revolution will be digitized. Or
perhaps it has already begun.

John Doe
Author, "The Revolution Will Be Digitized"
27 9
InternationalConsortium ofInvestigative Journalists
The ability to search and extract useful information from such a
huge amount of unstructured data (2.6 terabytes, 11.5 million files) is a
daunting task that may not have been possible just. a few years ago.
However, technological advances have assisted in researching "the
variety of file types (from spreadsheets, emails and PDFs to obscure and
old formats no longer in use), and the logistics of making it all securely
searchable for more than 370 journalists around the world are just a few
of the hurdles faced ....
Technology and the Battle Between the "Haves and "Have Nots"

A.

To paraphrase Harvard Professor Lawrence Lessig, code is law, and
28
he who writes the code controls the laws. ' A prominent message from
283
2 82
is
the Panama Papers, Wikileaks, and Edward Snowden disclosureS
Id.; see also Robert W. McGee, Is Tax Evasion Unethical?, 42 KAN. L. REV.
278.
411 (1994).
279. Doe, supra note 271.
280. See Mar Cabra & Erin Kissane, Wrangling 2.6TB of Data: The People and the
Technology Behind the Panama Papers, THE INT'L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE

JOURNALISTS (Apr. 25, 2016), https://panamapapers.icij.org/blog/20160425-data-techteam-ICIJ.html.
281.

See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, VERSION 2.0

at 6 (Basic Books 2006).
282. See generally Marvin Ammori, The 'New' New York Times: Free Speech
Lawyering in the Age of Google and Twitter, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2259 (2014); Jack M.
Balkin, The First Amendment is an Information Policy, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (2012);
Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating First
Amendment Protectionfor Leakers of ClassifiedInformation, 6 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y
409 (2013); Derek E. Bambauer, Consider the Censor, 1 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL'Y 31
(2011); Jerome A. Barron, The Pentagon Papers Case and the Wikileaks Controversy:
National Security and the First Amendment, 1 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL'Y 49 (2011);
Patricia L. Bellia, WikiLeaks. and the Institutional Frameworkfor National Security
Disclosures, 121 YALE L.J. 1448 (2012); Jeffrey S. Brand, Eavesdropping on Our
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Founding Fathers: How a Return to the Republic's Core Democratic Values Can Help
Us Resolve the Surveillance Crisis, 6 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 1 (2015); Gabriel J. Michael,
Who's Afraid of Wikileaks? Missed Opportunities in PoliticalScience Research, 32 REV.
POL'Y REs. 175 (2015); Adam D. Moore, Privacy, Security, and Government
Surveillance: Wikileaks and the New Accountability, 25 PUB. AFFAIRS Q. (2011); Mark
Fenster, Disclosure'sEffects: Wikileaks and Transparency, 97 IOWA L. REV. 753 (2012);
David Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones

Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013); Alasdair S.
Roberts, WikiLeaks: The Illusion of Transparency, INT'L REV. ADMIN. Sci. (2012);
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that greater forced-transparency appears to be a global trend, even among
the more affluent and technologically-advanced societies. Our attempt to
understand and analyze the facts leading up to the Panama Papers
disclosures is still in its infancy.

As of this date, it remains unclear

whether release of the 11.5 million documents is attributable to an
insider-whistleblower or is the result of a computer hack. However, the
recent successful hacking trend of highly sensitive information should
create apprehension about the security of similar documents located at
other law firms throughout the world.2 84 The vulnerability of highly
sensitive financial data at some of the largest and most prestigious law
firms has been noted within recent months.285
B.

Networked, Encrypted, Instant, Widespread Communication

An example of how social media is proving to be a highly
productive tool in fighting corruption is found in the efforts of 39 yearold father of two, Russian anti-corruption activist Alexey Navalny, who
has gained a following by posting "his suspicions, along with political
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L.Q. REP. 262 (2014); Lawrence J. Trautman, Jason Triche & James C. Wetherbe,
Corporate Information Governance Under Fire, 8 J. STRAT. & INT'L STUD. 105 (2013);
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Lessons from PayPal, 16 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 261 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman,
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and cultural commentary, online at navalny.livejournal.com . . .
Harvard Professors Paul M. Healy and Karthik Ramanna report that:

Navalny started tracking other Russian companies, particularly stateowned petroleum corporations, and found suspicious patterns in their
procurement practices. For instance, in December 2008 Navalny
announced that he had uncovered a deal in which Gazprom purchased
gas from a small company, Novatek, through an intermediary,
Transinvestgas. He learned that, just a few days earlier, Gazprom
had declined to buy the same gas directly from Novatek for a third of
the price it ultimately paid. An official investigation later revealed
that Transinvestgas had channeled the roughly US$10 million it made
on the deal to a shell company, presumably so that someone could
collect a kickback. 287

'

With a string of corruption disclosures to his credit, "Navalny began
to receive international recognition for his work. Awarded a Yale World
Fellowship in 2010, he used his new bully pulpit in New Haven to
publish the charge that Transneft's management had siphoned off US$4
billion from a trans-Siberian oil-pipeline construction project.",2 88 The
Transneft disclosure "prompted a flood of e-mail from Russian netizens,
who pointed Navalny to equally bizarre deals." 28 9
By examining two case studies of Russian social media corruption
disclosures, Professor Florian Toepfl adds to our knowledge about the
complex interaction between new media, power, and scandal. 2 90 Toepfl
finds that "Russia's ruling elites are currently very much capable of
managing public outrage arising from the new sphere of social media
according to their specific political aims."2 9
Scandals emanating from the new sphere of social media can be both
beneficial and detrimental to the democratization of authoritarian
286. See Paul M. Healy & Karthik Ramanna, When the CrowdFights Corruption, 91
Bus. REv. 1 (2013); see also The Blog of Navalny in English, http://navalnyen.livejournal.com/ (last viewed Mar. 4, 2017).
287. Healy & Ramanna, supra note 286.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. See Florian Toepfl, ManagingPublic Outrage: Power, Scandal, and New Media
in ContemporaryRussia, 13 NEW MEDIA & Soc'Y 1301 (2011).
291. Id. at 1314; see also Sandra Cortesi et al., Digitally Connected: Global
Perspectives on Youth and Digital Media (Berkman Center Research, Publication No.
2015-6, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2585686 (discussing inequitable access, risks to
safety and privacy, civic engagement and innovation); Bruce Etling, Robert Faris, John
G. Palfrey, Political Change in the Digital Age: The Fragility and Promise of Online
Organizing (Berkman Center Research, Publication No. 2010-15, 2010) (advocating that
more attention should be paid to the means of overcoming the difficulties of online
organization in the face of authoritarian governments in an increasingly digital
geopolitical environment), http://ssm.com/abstract-1871316.
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regimes. Yet, it seems obvious that in recent years, 'ground swells of
public conversation around politically inflammatory topics' have
been among the severest challenges to political elites in nondemocratic regimes that emanated from the new networked spheres
292
of social media.

A number of other studies have investigated the Internet's impact
on Russian politics, media and society.293 Harvard's Berkman Center for
Internet and Society continues to produce valuable scholarship exploring
the impact of technology on the peoples of the world.294
Social media success in fighting corruption is also reported in India,
where Bangalore-based IPaidABribe.com provides a platform where
"[a]nonymous users can disclose the nature, amount and recipients of the
bribes they have paid; report if a bribe wasn't demanded where it was
expected; or share experiences when they forestalled a bribe by arguing
IPaidABribe.com reports that during its first six
or protesting."295
months of operation, "the website received 250,000 hits and logged
5,000 bribery reports."29 6
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Disclosures contained in the Panama Papers about illicit gains
derived from global corruption far exceed the amount of space allotted
for a single law journal article. As a result, the research and writing
challenge for this author has been to strictly edit background materials to
make room for inclusion of important new disclosures, often at the cost
of information helpful to the reader. Therefore, a substantial amount of
text has been reserved for future installments. Ample subject matter
292.
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Publication No. 2012-2, 2012), http://ssm.com/abstract-2014998; Bruce Etling et. al.,
Public Discourse in the Russian Blogosphere: Mapping RuNet Politics and Mobilization

(Berkman Center Research, Publication No. 2010-11, 2010), http://ssm.com/abstrac
t=1698344; John Kelly et al., Mapping Russian Twitter (Berkman Center Research,

Publication No. 2012-3, 2012), http://ssm.com/abstract-2028158.
294. See Urs Gasser et al., Internet Monitor 2014: Reflections on the Digital World:
Platforms, Policy, Privacy, andPublic Discourse (Berkman Center Res, Publication No.
2014-17, 2014), http://ssm.com/abstract-2538813; Urs Gasser et al., Online Security in
the Middle East and North Africa: A Survey of Perceptions, Knowledge and Practice

(Berkman Center Research, Publication No. 2011-04, 2011), http://ssm.com/abstract
=1942857; Hal Roberts et al., The Evolving Landscape of Internet Control: A Summary
of Our Recent Research and Recommendations (Berkman Center Research, Publication
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remains for research, including:
an analysis of the impact and
sufficiency of pending tax treaties; proposed amendments to the Bank
Secrecy Act; impact of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act;
enforcement and impact of the Report of Foreign Bank Account (FBAR);
proposed rules regarding disclosure of beneficial ownership,
"disregarded entities;" proposed legislation to enhance and strengthen
efforts to combat transnational corruption; effective ways to fight money
laundering, terrorist finance and tax evasion; proposed "Reciprocal
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)" legislation; and
exploration of where we go from here. Keeping up with rapid
technological change will continue to challenge legislators worldwide.29 7
VIII.CONCLUSION

While disclosures thus far from the Panama Papers are likely to be
little more than the tip of the iceberg, some preliminary conclusions can
still be drawn. We are persuaded by comments made by World Bank
Group President Jim Yong Kim when he says, "transparency is not going
to move backwards. The world is going to become only more and more
transparent as we move forward." 2 9 8 Already, legal authorities around
the world have instituted investigations based on these disclosures.
Criminal prosecutions and public outrage at revelations about widespread
corruption seem highly probable. Whether continued regime change and
political instability results is yet to be seen. When it comes to combating
bribery, corruption, and tax evasion, it is possible that in the fullness of
time, the Panama Papers may become viewed as the gift that keeps on
giving.

297. Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin Harrell, Bitcoin Versus Regulated Payment
Systems: What Gives?, 38 CARDOZo L. REv. 1041 (2017); Lawrence J. Trautman, Is
Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future of FinancialServices?, 69 C.F. L. Q. R.
232 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, Virtual Currencies: Bitcoin & What Now After
Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 13 (2014).
298. See Transcript of World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim's Opening Press
Conference, 2016 WBG/IMF Spring Meetings, Washington, DC (Apr. 14, 2016),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2016/04/14/transcript-world-bank-grouppresident-jim-yong-kim-opening-press-conference.
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IX. APPENDIX ONE: MOSSACK FONSECA STATEMENT REGARDING
RECENT MEDIA COVERAGE
Statement Regarding Recent Media Coverage

Recent media reports have portrayed an inaccurate view of the
services that we provide and, despite our efforts to correct the record,
misrepresented the nature of our work and its role in global financial
markets.
These reports rely on supposition and stereotypes, and play on the
public's lack of familiarity with the work of firms like ours. The
unfortunate irony is that the materials on which these reports are
based actually show the high standards we operate under, specifically
that:
* we conduct due diligence on clients at the outset of a potential
engagement and on an ongoing basis;
* we routinely deny services to individuals who are compromised or
who fail to provide information we need in order to comply with
"know your client" obligations or when we identify other red flags
through our due diligence;
* we routinely resign from client engagements when ongoing due
diligence and/or updates to sanctions lists reveals that a party to a
company for which we provide services been either convicted or
listed by a sanctioning body;
* we routinely comply with requests from authorities investigating
companies or individuals for whom we are providing services; and
* we work with established intermediaries, such as investment banks,
accountancies and law firms, as part of the regulated global financial
system. We would like to take this opportunity to address some
specific misconceptions about our work and clarify the inaccuracies
that are rife in the recent media reports.
We provide company incorporation and related administrative
services that are widely available and commonly used worldwide.
Incorporating companies is the normal activity of lawyers and agents
around the world. Services such as company formations, registered
agent, and others are frequently used and provided in many
worldwide jurisdictions, including the United States and the United
Kingdom.
Moreover, it is legal and common for companies to establish
commercial entities in different jurisdictions for a variety of
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legitimate reasons, including conducting cross-border mergers and
acquisitions, bankruptcies, estate planning, personal safety, and
restructurings and pooling of investment capital from investors
residing in different jurisdictions who want a neutral legal and tax
regime that does not benefit or disadvantage any one investor.
Our registered agent and corporate secretarial services are limited to a
narrow set of administrative services.
These services are related to facilitating document filings before the
authorities and registry of a company's jurisdiction, and helping a
company register for taxes and file for licenses, manage patents and
trademarks, file tax returns and other documentation.
The resident agent is not involved in managing the business in any
way. We do not open or manage accounts, take custody of money or
assets (aside from fees paid to us for our services), monitor
transactions, perform. audits, advise on transactions or have
discretionary authority to make decisions on behalf of the companies
for which we serve as registered agents or for which we perform
corporate secretarial services.
Our services are regulated on multiple levels, often by overlapping
agencies, and we have a strong compliance record.
Our business is regulated by several different oversight and
enforcement agencies, including the Banking Superintendence of
Panama and the Intendancy of Non-financial Regulated Services
Providers. We are also subject to regulatory oversight - and
enforcement in all of the other jurisdictions where we incorporate
companies. In addition, we have always complied with international
protocols such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and, more
recently, the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) to
assure as is reasonably possible, that the companies we incorporate
are not being used for tax evasion, money laundering, terrorist
finance or other illicit purposes.
The FATF, in particular, praised Panama in its February 2016 plenary
session, saying specifically that Panama has made "significant
progress in improving its AML/CFT (anti-money laundering and
combating the financing of terrorism) regime." The FATF,
subsequent to the plenary session, removed Panama from its "gray
list" of uncooperative jurisdictions.
We are responsible members of the global financial and business
community.
We conduct thorough due diligence on all new and prospective
clients that often exceeds in stringency the existing rules and
standards to which we and others are bound. Many of our clients
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come through established and reputable law firms and financial
institutions across the world, including the major correspondent
banks, which are also bound by international "know your client"
(KYC) protocols and their own domestic regulations and laws.
If a new client/entity is not willing and/or able to provide to us the
appropriate documentation indicating who they are, and (when
applicable) from where their funds are derived, we will not work with
that client/entity. Indeed, the documents cited in the media reports
show that we routinely deny services to individuals who are
compromised or who fail to provide information we need in order to
comply with our KYC and other obligations.
Our due diligence procedures require us to update the information
that we have on clients and to periodically verify that no negative
results exist in regards to the companies we incorporate and the
individuals behind them. Again, the documents cited in the media
reports show that we routinely resign from client engagements when
ongoing due diligence and updates to sanctions lists reveal that a
beneficial owner of a company for which we provide services is
compromised.
For 40 years Mossack Fonseca has operated beyond reproach in our
home country and other jurisdictions where we have operations.
Our firm has never been accused or charged in connection with
criminal wrongdoing.
However, we are legally and practically limited in our ability to
regulate the use of companies we incorporate or to which we provide
other services. We are not involved in managing our clients'
companies. Excluding the professional fees we earn, we do not take
possession or custody of clients' money, or have anything to do with
any of the direct financial aspects related to operating their
businesses.
We operate in jurisdictions with increasingly stringent financial and
legal controls.
All of the jurisdictions where we have operations have made
significant strides in their efforts to comply with global protocols to
prevent abuse of their financial and corporate systems. This includes
preventing money laundering, combating terrorist financing and
preventing tax evasion.
Most of the jurisdictions have formal tax information exchange
agreements with several countries that are approved by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Panama has nine formal OECD-approved tax information exchange
agreements, including with the United States and Canada, and 16
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double taxation agreements (which include provisions for
information sharing between authorities). The OECD has recognized
Panama for improving the government's access to information about
beneficial ownership of entities incorporated in its jurisdiction as well
as for improving the sharing of such information with authorities in
other jurisdictions.
To quote from the OECD's most recent peer review of Panama:
"The 2014 Supplementary Agreement noted the significant progress
made by Panama in expanding its exchange of information network
since the 2010 Phase 1 Report, which bought the number of signed
EOI (exchange of information agreements) agreements from one to
25."
In addition, Panama, the British Virgin Islands (BVI), and the United
States have agreed to terms for financial institutions in their
jurisdictions to comply with the U.S. Treasury's Foreign Account
Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). This act ensures that American
citizens with accounts in these territories declare and pay any taxes
on income or investments earned in them that are due to the U.S.
Internal Revenue Service. To date, over 1,000 financial institutions in
Panama, including local banks, foreign bank branches and investment
funds, have complied with FATCA.
We regret any misuse of our services and actively take steps to
prevent it.
We regret any misuse of companies that we incorporate or the
services we provide and take steps wherever possible to uncover and
stop such use. If we detect suspicious activity or misconduct, we are
quick to report it to the authorities. Similarly, when authorities
approach us with evidence of possible misconduct, we always
cooperate fully with them.
With regards to specific allegations in the media reports, we would
like to comment as follows:
(a) Tax Evasion and Avoidance: Our company does not advise
clients on the structuring of corporate vehicles and the use they may
make of them We likewise do not offer solutions whose purpose is to
hide unlawful acts such as tax evasion. Our clients request our
services after being duly advised by qualified professionals in their
places of business. Moreover, it should be made clear that tax
avoidance and evasion are not the same thing. For example, a client
can use the structures provided by us for tax optimization of his/her
estate, such as taking advantage of provisions in treaties for avoiding
international double taxation. Such behavior is perfectly legal. (b)
Due Diligence on Clients: To begin with, approximately 90% of our
clientele is comprised of professional clients, such as international
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financial institutions as well as trust companies and prominent law
and accounting firms, who act as intermediaries and are regulated in
the jurisdiction of their business. These clients are obliged to perform
due diligence on their clients in accordance with the KYC and AML
regulations to which they are subject.
(c) Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs): We have duly established
policies and procedures to identify and handle cases where
individuals either qualify as PEPs or are related to them. As per our
Risk Based Approach, PEPs are considered to be high risk
individuals. Hence, enhanced due diligence procedures apply in these
cases. Also, periodic follow-up is conducted to assure that no
negative results are found. Lastly, according to international KYC
policies, PEPs do not have to be rejected just for being so; it is just a
matter of proper risk analysis and administration to perform enhanced
due diligence on them.
(d) Sanctions Lists and Convicted Criminals: The Service Provision
Agreements signed with our clients impose on them the obligation to
notify us as soon as they have knowledge of a client of theirs having
been either convicted or listed by a sanctioning body. Likewise, we
have our own procedures in place to identify such individuals, to the
extent it is reasonably possible. Indeed, the documents cited in the
media reports show specific instances demonstrating that once these
types of situations are identified, we routinely discontinue the
provision of our services. We have an obligation to follow an orderly
administrative process when resigning from client engagements,
which can vary depending on the regulations of the respective
jurisdiction. Also, authorities sometime require the registered agent
not to file any resignation in order to prevent obstructing their
investigation.
(e) Provision of Company Secretarial Services: Company Secretarial
Services are legal services that allow a professional company
provider to act on behalf of a company that is owned by third parties.
Company Secretarial Services are not used to hide the identity of the
real owners of the company as for instance, a director is not in its
nature the owner of the company. These services often include
directorships and facilitate document filings before the authorities
and registry of a company's jurisdiction. For example, a secretary
might help a company register for taxes and file for licenses, manage
patents and trademarks, tax returns and other documentation to be
handled and filed. Company Secretarial Services are provided by
many firms to professional clients and investors all over the world.
The same director or company secretary can act on behalf of many
different companies in different jurisdictions. That is widely accepted
and perfectly legal, especially in cases where the purpose of a
company is to be a holding company or own immovable or movable
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property. The fact that many companies have the same directors and/
or address does not mean that such companies are connected in any
way, as is commonly assumed. Usually a director or company/
corporate secretary has no economic interest or commercial link to
the company's activity and he/she does not endorse, participate or
assist in the commercial or passive roles of a company in any way.
Following pre-established guidelines, the secretary appoints agents
and attorneys that carry out the administration of the company.
(f) Shareholders and Beneficial Owners: Closely related to the point
above, as part of the services our trust company provides, we often
constitute trusts for shares. As a result, allegations that we provide
shareholders with structures supposedly designed to hide the identity
of the real owners, are completely unsupported and false. These types'
of services are always supported by the existence of legally
recognized vehicles utilized for such purposes by all service
providers in this industry. Even though we do provide
shareholdership services through the legal structures already
explained, we do not provide beneficiary services to deceive banks.
Banks currently carry out their due diligence procedures just as we
do. It is difficult, not to say impossible, not to provide banks with the
identity of final beneficiaries and the origin of funds.
(h) Backdated Documents:. The issuance of documents -with a
retroactive date is a well-founded and accepted practice when the
decisions made with regard to the particular document. are recorded in
resolutions approved before or when the transaction in particular has
taken place and the formalization is. still pending. Such practice is
common in our industry and its aim is not to cover up or hide
299
unlawful acts.

299.

Statement Regarding Recent Media Coverage, MOSSACK FONSECA (Apr.

2016), http://mossfonmedia.com/wp-contentiuploads/2016/04/Statement-Regarding-Rece
nt-Media-Coverage 4-1-2016.pdf.
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APPENDIX Two: THE REVOLUTION WILL BE DIGITIZED

John Doe
Income inequality is one of the defining issues of our time. It affects
all of us, the world over. The debate over its sudden acceleration has
raged for years, with politicians, academics and activists alike
helpless to stop its steady growth despite countless speeches,
statistical analyses, a few meagre protests, and the occasional
documentary. Still, questions remain: why? And why now?
The Panama Papers provide a compelling answer to these questions:
massive, pervasive corruption. And it's not a coincidence that the
answer comes from a law firm. More than just a cog in the machine
of "wealth management,' Mossack Fonseca used its influence to
write and bend laws worldwide to favour the interests of criminals
over a period of decades. In the case of the island of Niue, the firm
essentially ran a tax haven from start to finish. Ram6n Fonseca and
Jilrgen Mossack would have us believe that their firm's shell
companies, sometimes called "special purpose vehicles," are just like
cars. But used car salesmen don't write laws. And the only "special
purpose" of the vehicles they produced was too often fraud, on a
grand scale.
Shell companies are often associated with the crime of tax evasion,
but the Panama Papers show beyond a shadow of a doubt that
although shell companies are not illegal by definition, they are used
to carry out a wide array of serious crimes that go beyond evading
taxes. I decided to expose Mossack Fonseca because I thought its
founders, employees and clients should have to answer for their roles
in these crimes, only some of which have come to light thus far. It
will take years, possibly decades, for the full extent of the firm's
sordid acts to become known.
In the meantime, a new global debate has started, which is
encouraging. Unlike the polite rhetoric of yesteryear that carefully
omitted any suggestion of wrongdoing by the elite, this debate
focuses directly on what matters.
In that regard, I have a few thoughts.
For the record, I do not work for any government or intelligence
agency, directly or as a contractor, and I never have. My viewpoint is
entirely my own, as was my decision to share the documents with
Siiddeutsche Zeitung and the International Consortium of
Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), not for any specific political purpose,
but simply because I understood enough about their. contents to
realize the scale of the injustices they described.
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The prevailing media narrative thus far has focused on the scandal of
what is legal and allowed in this system. What is allowed is indeed
scandalous and must be changed. But we must not lose sight of
another important fact: the law firm, its founders, and employees
actually did knowingly violate myriad laws worldwide, repeatedly.
Publicly they plead ignorance, but the documents show detailed
knowledge and deliberate wrongdoing. At the very least we already
know that Mossack personally perjured himself before a federal court
in Nevada, and we also know that his information technology staff
attempted to cover up the underlying lies. They should all be
prosecuted accordingly with no special treatment.
In the end, thousands of prosecutions could stem from the Panama
Papers, if only law enforcement could access and evaluate the actual
documents. ICIJ and its partner publications have rightly stated that
they will not provide them to law enforcement agencies. I, however,
would be willing to cooperate with law enforcement to the extent that
I am able.
That being said, I have watched as one after another, whistleblowers
and activists in the United States and Europe have had their lives
destroyed by the circumstances they find themselves in after shining
a light on obvious wrongdoing. Edward Snowden is stranded in
Moscow, exiled due to the Obama administration's decision to
prosecute him under the Espionage Act. For his revelations about the
NSA, he deserves a hero's welcome and a substantial prize, not
banishment. Bradley Birkenfeld was awarded millions for his
information concerning Swiss bank UBS-and was still given a
prison sentence by the Justice Department. Antoine Deltour is
presently on trial for providing journalists with information about
how Luxembourg granted secret "sweetheart" tax deals to multinational corporations, effectively stealing billions in tax revenues
from its neighbour countries. And there are plenty more examples.
Legitimate whistleblowers who expose unquestionable wrongdoing,
whether insiders or outsiders, deserve immunity from government
retribution, full stop. Until governments codify legal protections for
whistleblowers into law, enforcement agencies will simply have to
depend on their own resources or on-going global media coverage for
documents.
In the meantime, I call on the European Commission, the British
Parliament, the United States Congress, and all nations to take swift
action not only to protect whistleblowers, but to put an end to the
global abuse of corporate registers. In the European Union, every
member state's corporate register should be freely accessible, with
detailed data plainly available on ultimate beneficial owners. The
United Kingdom can be proud of its domestic initiatives thus far, but
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it still has a vital role to play by ending financial secrecy on its
various island territories, which are unquestionably the cornerstone of
institutional corruption worldwide. And the United States can clearly
no longer trust its fifty states to make sound decisions about their
own corporate data. It is long past time for Congress to step in and
force transparency by setting standards for disclosure and public
access.
And while it's one thing to extol the virtues of government
transparency at summits and in sound bites, it's quite another to
actually implement it. It is an open secret that in the United States,
elected representatives spend the majority of their time fundraising.
Tax evasion cannot possibly be fixed while elected officials are
pleading for money from the very elites who have the strongest
incentives to avoid taxes relative to any other segment of the
population. These unsavoury political practices have come full circle
and they are irreconcilable. Reform of America's broken campaign
finance system cannot wait.
Of course, those are hardly the only issues that need fixing. Prime
Minister John Key of New Zealand has been curiously quiet about his
country's role in enabling the financial fraud Mecca that is the Cook
Islands. In Britain, the Tories have been shameless about concealing
their own practices involving offshore companies, while Jennifer
Shasky Calvery, the director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network at the United States Treasury, just announced her
resignation to work instead for HSBC, one of the most notorious
banks on the planet (not coincidentally headquartered in London).
And so the familiar swish of America's revolving door echoes amidst
deafening global silence from thousands of yet-to-be-discovered
ultimate beneficial owners who are likely praying that her
replacement is equally spineless. In the face of political cowardice,
it's tempting to yield to defeatism, to argue that the status quo
remains fundamentally unchanged, while the Panama Papers are, if
nothing else, a glaring symptom of our society's progressively
diseased and decaying moral fabric.
But the issue is finally on the table, and that change takes time is no
surprise. For fifty years, executive, legislative, and judicial branches
around the globe have utterly failed to address the metastasizing tax
havens spotting Earth's surface. Even today, Panama says it wants to
be known for more than papers, but its government has conveniently
examined only one of the horses on its offshore merry-go-round.
Banks, financial regulators and tax authorities have failed. Decisions
have been made that have spared the wealthy while focusing instead
on reining in middle- and low-income citizens.
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Hopelessly backward and inefficient courts have failed. Judges have
too often acquiesced to the arguments of the rich, whose lawyersand not just Mossack Fonseca-are well trained in honouring the
letter of the law, while simultaneously doing everything in their
power to desecrate its spirit. The media has failed. Many news
networks are cartoonish parodies of their former selves, individual
billionaires appear to have taken up newspaper ownership as a hobby,
limiting coverage of serious matters concerning the wealthy, and
serious investigative journalists lack funding. The impact is real: in
addition to Siiddeutsche Zeitung and ICIJ, and despite explicit claims
to the contrary, several major media outlets did have editors review
documents from the Panama Papers. They chose not to cover them.
The sad truth is that among the most prominent and capable media
organizations in the world there was not a single one interested in
reporting on the story. Even Wikileaks didn't answer its tip line
repeatedly.
But most of all, the legal profession has failed. Democratic
governance depends upon responsible individuals throughout the
entire system who understand and uphold the law, not who
understand and exploit it. On average, lawyers have become so
deeply corrupt that it is imperative for major changes in the
profession to take place, far beyond the meek proposals already on
the table. To start, the term "legal ethics," upon which codes of
conduct and licensure are nominally based, has become an
oxymoron. Mossack Fonseca did not work in a vacuum-despite
repeated fines and documented regulatory violations, it found allies
and clients at major law firms in virtually every nation. If the
industry's shattered economics were not already evidence enough,
there is now no denying that lawyers can no longer be permitted to
regulate one another. It simply doesn't work. Those able to pay the
most can always find a lawyer to serve their ends, whether that
lawyer is at Mossack Fonseca or another firm of which we remain
unaware. What about the rest of society?
The collective impact of these failures has been a complete erosion of
ethical standards, ultimately leading to a novel system we still call
Capitalism, but which is tantamount to economic slavery. In this
system-our system-the slaves are unaware both of their status and
of their masters, who exist in a world apart where the intangible
shackles are carefully hidden amongst reams of unreachable legalese.
The horrific magnitude of detriment to the world should shock us all
awake. But when it takes a whistleblower to sound the alarm, it is
cause for even greater concern. It signals that democracy's checks
and balances have all failed, that the breakdown is systemic, and that
severe instability could be just around the corner. So now is the time
for real action, and that starts with asking questions.
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Historians can easily recount how issues involving taxation and
imbalances of power have led to revolutions in ages past. Then,
military might was necessary to subjugate peoples, whereas now,
curtailing information access is just as effective or more so, since the
act is often invisible. Yet we live in a time of inexpensive, limitless
digital storage and fast internet connections that transcend national
boundaries. It doesn't take much to connect the dots: from start to
finish, inception to global media distribution, the next revolution will
be digitized.
Or perhaps it has already begun.300
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